Kansas v. Hendricks

In Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997), the United States Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of an involuntary commitment scheme similar to California's SVP Act. Noting that dangerousness alone would not support an indefinite involuntary commitment, the court concluded the sexual predator law at issue satisfied substantive due process because it also required proof of mental illness or mental abnormality. ( Id. at p. 358.) The United States Supreme Court upheld the definition of "mental abnormality" contained in Kansas's SVP law against a substantive due process challenge. In so holding, the court explained: "A finding of dangerousness, standing alone, is ordinarily not a sufficient ground upon which to justify indefinite involuntary commitment. We have sustained civil commitment statutes when they have coupled proof of dangerousness with the proof of some additional factor, such as a 'mental illness' or 'mental abnormality. These added statutory requirements serve to limit involuntary civil confinement to those who suffer from a volitional impairment rendering them dangerous beyond their control. The Kansas Act is plainly of a kind with these other civil commitment statutes: It requires a finding of future dangerousness, and then links that finding to the existence of a 'mental abnormality' or 'personality disorder' that makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the person to control his dangerous behavior.." ( Id. at p. 358.) The high court rejected the notion that the term "'mental illness,'" as used in its prior cases, had "any talismanic significance." ( Id. at p. 359.) "Not only do 'psychiatrists disagree widely and frequently on what constitutes mental illness,' , but the Court itself has used a variety of expressions to describe the mental condition of those properly subject to civil confinement. " (Ibid.) The court noted that it had "never required state legislatures to adopt any particular nomenclature in drafting civil commitment statutes," and instead "traditionally left to legislators the task of defining terms of a medical nature that have legal significance. " (Ibid.) Finally, the court recognized that "legal definitions, ... which must 'take into account such issues as individual responsibility ... and competency,' need not mirror those advanced by the medical profession. " (Ibid.) The Court noted the importance of the "volitional element" in civil commitment proceedings: "A finding of dangerousness, standing alone, is ordinarily not a sufficient ground upon which to justify indefinite involuntary commitment. We have sustained civil commitment statutes when they have coupled proof of dangerousness with the proof of some additional factor, such as a 'mental illness' or 'mental abnormality.' These added statutory requirements serve to limit involuntary civil confinement to those who suffer from a volitional impairment rendering them dangerous beyond their control. The Kansas Act is plainly of a kind with these other civil commitment statutes: It requires a finding of future dangerousness, and then links that finding to the existence of a 'mental abnormality' or 'personality disorder' that makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the person to control his dangerous behavior. Kan. Stat. Ann. 59-29a02 (b) (1994). The precommitment requirement of a 'mental abnormality' or 'personality disorder' is consistent with the requirements of these other statutes that we have upheld in that it narrows the class of persons eligible for confinement to those who are unable to control their dangerousness." (Id. at 358.) The Kansas Act also imposed indefinite terms and required annual reviews. (Hendricks, at p. 363.) The United States Supreme Court concluded that an indefinite commitment, standing alone, did not establish that the statutes in dispute were punitive. The court found that "far from any punitive objective, the confinement's duration is instead linked to the stated purposes of the commitment, namely, to hold the person until his mental abnormality no longer causes him to be a threat to others. . . . Furthermore, commitment under the Kansas Act is only potentially indefinite. The maximum amount of time an individual can be incapacitated pursuant to a single judicial proceeding is one year. Kan. Stat. Ann., 59-29a08. If Kansas seeks to continue the detention beyond that year, a court must once again determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the detainee satisfies the same standards as required for the initial confinement. This requirement again demonstrates that Kansas does not intend an individual committed pursuant to the Act to remain confined any longer than he suffers from a mental abnormality rendering him unable to control his dangerousness." (Hendricks, supra, 521 U.S. at pp. 363-364.) The Court examined Kansas's civil commitment procedures for SVP's. The court noted that a "finding of dangerousness, standing alone, is ordinarily not a sufficient ground upon which to justify indefinite involuntary commitment"; however, civil commitment statutes have been sustained when they require proof of an additional factor such as mental illness or mental abnormality. (Id. at p. 358.) The court noted that Kansas's commitment statute "requires a finding of future dangerousness, and then links that finding to the existence of a 'mental abnormality' or 'personality disorder' that makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the person to control his dangerous behavior." (Ibid.) The court remarked that the "'mental abnormality'" factor served "to limit involuntary civil confinement to those who suffer from a volitional impairment rendering them dangerous beyond their control." (Ibid.) The court concluded that the statutory scheme complied with due process requirements. (Id. at p. 371.) The Court explained: "'the mere fact that a person is detained does not inexorably lead to the conclusion that the government has imposed punishment.' The State may take measures to restrict the freedom of the dangerously mentally ill. This is a legitimate nonpunitive governmental objective and has been historically so regarded. The Court has, in fact, cited the confinement of 'mentally unstable individuals who present a danger to the public' as a classic example of nonpunitive detention." (Hendricks, supra, 521 U.S. at p. 363.) In Hendricks, the court also recognized that "unlike a criminal statute, no finding of scienter is required to commit an individual who is found to be a sexually violent predator; instead, the commitment determination is made based on a 'mental abnormality' or 'personality disorder' rather than on one's criminal intent." (Hendricks, supra, 521 U.S. at p. 362.) The same standard holds true of the SVPA, which bases a commitment determination on the diagnosis of a "mental disorder." ( 6600, subds. (a)(1), (c).) The Hendricks court further observed that the absence of a scienter requirement "is evidence that confinement under the statute is not intended to be retributive. Nor can it be said that the legislature intended the Act to function as a deterrent. Those person committed under the Act are, by definition, suffering from a diagnosed mental disorder that prevents them from exercising adequate control over their behavior. Such persons are therefore unlikely to be deterred by the threat of confinement." (Hendricks, supra, 521 U.S. at pp. 362-363.) The United States Supreme Court rejected an ex post facto challenge to Kansas's SVP statute. (Id. at pp. 361-369, 370-371.) The Supreme Court instructed that a state Legislature's stated intent regarding the purpose of a civil commitment statute is an important starting point in determining whether that statute is intended to punish SVP's, and courts should ordinarily defer to a legislative statement that the statute is not penal in nature. (Id. at p. 361.) Nevertheless, an appellant is not precluded from showing that the statute is so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate the Legislature's stated intent. (Ibid.) In attempting to do so, however, the appellant bears a heavy burden. (Ibid.) The United States Supreme Court explained that a "finding of dangerousness, standing alone, is ordinarily not a sufficient ground upon which to justify indefinite involuntary commitment. We have sustained civil commitment statutes when they have coupled proof of dangerousness with the proof of some additional factor, such as a 'mental illness' or 'mental abnormality.' These added statutory requirements serve to limit involuntary civil confinement to those who suffer from a volitional impairment rendering them dangerous beyond their control." In the particular case before it, the Hendricks Court concluded that the defendant's "admitted lack of volitional control, coupled with a prediction of future dangerousness, adequately distinguishes Hendricks from other dangerous persons more properly dealt with exclusively through criminal proceedings." (Id. at p. 360.) The Court, the court summarized several requirements for such proceedings. ( Id. at p. 350.) The confinement must take place under "proper procedures and evidentiary standards." ( Id. at p. 357.) Further, the state must restrict commitment to "a limited subclass of dangerous persons . . . ." (Ibid.) The court found of "central importance" that "a finding of dangerousness, standing alone, is ordinarily not a sufficient ground upon which to justify indefinite involuntary commitment." ( Id. at p. 358.) Pointing to civil commitment statutes of Kentucky, Illinois and Minnesota, the court noted it sustained those statutes because they "coupled proof of dangerousness with the proof of some additional factor, such as a 'mental illness' or 'mental abnormality. '" (Ibid.) According to the court, "these added statutory requirements serve to limit involuntary civil confinement to those who suffer from a volitional impairment rendering them dangerous beyond their control. The Kansas Act is plainly of a kind with other states' civil commitment statutes: It requires a finding of future dangerousness, and then links that finding to the existence of a 'mental abnormality' or 'personality disorder' that makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the person to control his dangerous behavior. Kan. Stat. Ann. 59-29a02(b) (1994). The precommitment requirement of a 'mental abnormality' or 'personality disorder' is consistent with the requirements of these other statutes that we have upheld in that it narrows the class of persons eligible for confinement to those who are unable to control their dangerousness." ( Id. at p. 358.) Under the Act, "mental abnormality" was defined as a "'congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity which predisposes the person to commit sexually violent offenses in a degree constituting such person a menace to the health and safety of others.'" Id. at 352 (quoting Kan. Stat. Ann. 59-29a02(b)). After its passage, the Kansas Act was invoked to involuntarily commit Leroy Hendricks (Hendricks), an inmate with a long history of sexually molesting children, shortly before he was scheduled to be released from prison. Upon Hendricks' challenge to his commitment on due process, double jeopardy, and ex post facto grounds, the Kansas Supreme Court invalidated the Act, holding that the Act's "precommitment condition of a 'mental abnormality' did not satisfy what the court perceived to be the 'substantive' due process requirement that involuntary civil commitment must be predicated on a finding of 'mental illness.'" Id. at 350 (quoting In re Hendricks, 259 Kan. 246, 912 P.2d 129, 138 (Kan. 1996)). The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the procedures followed by Kansas met substantive due process requirements in that the Act "requires a finding of future dangerousness, and then links that finding to the existence of a 'mental abnormality' or 'personality disorder' that makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the person to control his dangerous behavior." Id. at 358. The United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a statute that provided for an indeterminate commitment of an SVP " 'until such time as the person's mental abnormality or personality disorder has so changed that the person is safe to be at large.' " The Kansas scheme provided for an annual review to determine whether continued commitment was warranted; the committed person also could file a petition seeking to be released. (Ibid.) The Court explained that due to the annual review requirement, the commitment period was "only potentially indefinite." (Id. at p. 364.) The Court upheld the constitutionality of the Kansas statute governing the commitment of sexually violent persons against sweeping substantive due process, double jeopardy and ex post facto challenges. In doing so, the court summarized several requirements for such proceedings. (Hendricks, supra, 521 U.S. at p. 350.) The confinement must take place under "proper procedures and evidentiary standards." (Id. at p. 357.) Further, the state must restrict commitment to "a limited subclass of dangerous persons . . . ." (Ibid.) The court found of "central importance" that "a finding of dangerousness, standing alone, is ordinarily not a sufficient ground upon which to justify indefinite involuntary commitment." (Id. at p. 358.) Pointing to civil commitment statutes of Kentucky, Illinois and Minnesota, the court noted it sustained those statutes because they "coupled proof of dangerousness with the proof of some additional factor, such as a 'mental illness' or 'mental abnormality.' " (Ibid.) According to the court, "these added statutory requirements serve to limit involuntary civil confinement to those who suffer from a volitional impairment rendering them dangerous beyond their control. The Kansas Act is plainly of a kind with other states' civil commitment statutes: It requires a finding of future dangerousness, and then links that finding to the existence of a 'mental abnormality' or 'personality disorder' that makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the person to control his dangerous behavior. Kan. Stat. Ann. 59-29a02(b) (1994). The precommitment requirement of a 'mental abnormality' or 'personality disorder' is consistent with the requirements of these other statutes that we have upheld in that it narrows the class of persons eligible for confinement to those who are unable to control their dangerousness." (Id. at p. 358.) These requirements "serve to limit involuntary civil confinement to those who suffer from a volitional impairment rendering them dangerous beyond their control." (Ibid.)