In Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) the Unites States Supreme Court stated that promoting economic development is a traditional function of government, not distinguishable from other public purposes. In Kelo it was emphasized that property may not be taken under the pretext of a public purpose when the actual purpose is to bestow private benefits and that a taking is less likely to be pretexutal when the ultimate owner of the property is not known at the time of taking. The United States Supreme Court upheld a condemnation of residential buildings that were clearly not blighted in the sense of dilapidated but were located in a certified redevelopment area targeted for revitalization pursuant to a carefully considered plan, which included razing the residences to build a pharmaceutical research facility. The redevelopment authority had complied with the relevant municipal redevelopment statute, thus conferring a presumption of legitimacy on the selection of the geographic area targeted for redevelopment. See id. at 483 ("Those who govern the City were not confronted with the need to remove blight in the Fort Trumbull area, but their determination that the area was sufficiently distressed to justify a program of economic rejuvenation is entitled to our deference"). The only question before the Court was whether the "economic development" of the site constituted a public purpose sufficient to justify the condemnation under the constraints of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The Court answered this question in the affirmative, stating: "promoting economic development is a traditional and long accepted function of government" and "there is, moreover, no principled way of distinguishing economic development from the other public purposes that we have recognized." Id. at 484. The Court nevertheless recognized that, while the relevant local redevelopment statute opened the door to a taking for purely economic development, nothing precluded a state from imposing stricter public use requirements than that imposed under the federal baseline. The Court reaffirmed that once a determination is made that the taking is for a "public use" within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, it 'is not for the courts to oversee the choice of the boundary line nor to sit in review on the size of a particular project area. Once the question of the public purpose has been decided, the amount and character of land to be taken for the project and the need for a particular tract to complete the integrated plan rests in the discretion of the legislative branch.' Kelo, supra, 545 U.S. at 489, quoting, Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 35-36, 75 S. Ct. 98, 99 L. Ed. 27 (1954). The Court has made it clear that it will not "second-guess a City's determinations as to what lands it needs to acquire in order to effectuate a project."