In Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999), an expert was called to assess how a specific tire tread separated, whether through abuse or a defect. Id. at 153-54. The expert concluded that the tire tread separated due to a manufacturing defect, but deduced this using only a visual and tactile analysis. Id. The proponent of the expert argued that the use of the visual/tactile method by other experts and the expert's long experience working for Michelin Tires was sufficient to prove that the expert's method was reliable. Id. at 156. However, the Supreme Court disagreed. No one denies that an expert might draw a conclusion from a set of observations based on extensive and specialized experience. Nor does anyone deny that, as a general matter, tire abuse may often be identified by qualified experts through visual or tactile inspection of the tire. . . . As we said before, . . . the question before the trial court was specific, not general. The trial court had to decide whether this particular expert had sufficient specialized knowledge to assist the jurors "in deciding the particular issues in the case . . . ." The particular issue in this case concerned the use of two factor test and his related use of visual/tactile inspection to draw conclusions on the basis of what seemed small observational differences. We have found no indication in the record that other experts in the industry use the expert's two-factor test. . . . Of course, the expert himself claimed that his method was accurate, but, as we pointed out in Joiner, "nothing in either Daubert (Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc) or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion evidence that is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert." Id. at 156-57, 119 S. Ct. at 1178-79. The Court held that the basic gatekeeping obligation described in Daubert applies to all expert testimony on scientific, technical or other specialized matters within the scope of Federal Rule of Evidence 702. As a result of this decision, experts in technical fields are only allowed to give their testimony if they can pass the reliability standards of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. The court also explained: "We can neither rule out nor rule in for all cases and for all time the applicability of the factors mentioned in Daubert, nor can we now do so for subsets of cases categorized by category of expert or by kind of evidence. Too much depends upon the particular circumstances of the particular case at issue." Id at 150. In Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, the United State's Supreme Court recognized that "the trial court must have the same kind of latitude in deciding how to test an expert's reliability, and to decide whether or when special briefing or other proceedings are needed to investigate reliability, as it enjoys when it decides whether or not that expert's relevant testimony is reliable." Kumho Tire at 152. In turn, "the abuse of discretion standard applies as much to the trial court's decisions about how to determine reliability as to its ultimate conclusion." Id., citing General Elec. Co. v. Joiner (1997), 522 U.S. 136. Therefore, a trial court is not required to hold a pre-trial Daubert hearing. See State v. Fulton, Clermont App. No. CA2002-10-085, 2003 Ohio 5432, paragraphs 13-19 (finding no error in trial court's decision to deny pretrial Daubert hearing on the admissibility of evidence); See also, State v. Goins, Mahoning App. No. 02CA68, 2005 Ohio 1439.