In Lanzetta v. New Jersey (1938) 306 U.S. 451, the Supreme Court found that a New Jersey statute was so vague and uncertain as to be repugnant to the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The statute provided that " 'any person not engaged in any lawful occupation, known to be a member of any gang consisting of two or more persons, who has been convicted at least three times of being a disorderly person, or who has been convicted of any crime, in this or in any other State, is declared to be a gangster . . .' " and may be punished by fine or imprisonment. ( Lanzetta v. New Jersey, supra, 306 U.S. at p. 452.) Observing that the word "gang" has numerous and varied meanings and is undefined by the common law, the Supreme Court determined that the descriptions and illustrations used by the lower court to ascribe meaning to the word "are not sufficient to constitute definition, inclusive or exclusive." ( Id. at p. 457.) The court also found that "the lack of certainty of the challenged provision is not limited to the word 'gang' or to its dependent 'gangster.' . . . The enactment employs the expression, 'known to be a member.' It is ambiguous. There immediately arises the doubt whether actual or putative association is meant. If actual membership is required, that status must be established as a fact, and the word 'known' would be without significance. If reputed membership is enough, there is uncertainty whether that reputation must be general or extend only to some persons. And the statute fails to indicate what it constitutes membership or how one may join a 'gang.' " ( Id. at p. 458.) Because the statute condemned no act or omission, and the terms it used were so "vague, indefinite and uncertain" (ibid.), the court concluded that it violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.