In Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 101 S.Ct. 2153, 68 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Constitution does not require the appointment of counsel in every termination proceeding. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 31. However, the Supreme Court acknowledged that in a given case, the Eldridge factors could be distributed differently such that due process may require the appointment of counsel. See id. (noting that "'due process is not so rigid as to require that the significant factors in informality, flexibility and economy must always be sacrificed'") If the Department succeeds in terminating a parent's rights, the State will have "'worked a unique kind of deprivation. . . . A parent's interest in the accuracy and justice of the decision to terminate his or her parental status is . . . a commanding one.'" Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27. In accordance with Lassiter, the Court review the other state procedures that minimize the risk of erroneous deprivation. The Legislature has enacted a comprehensive statutory scheme to ensure that termination trials result in a correct decision. First, a petition to terminate parental rights must provide full notice to all parties involved and allege the statutory grounds for termination and that termination is in the child's best interest. TEX. FAM. CODE 102.008; 161.101. In Lassiter, the U.S. Supreme Court held that due process does not require states to provide indigent parents counsel in all termination cases. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 33-34. Before answering the due process question, the U.S. Supreme Court explained the nebulous nature of this concept: "Due process" has never been, and perhaps can never be, precisely defined. . . . Rather, the phrase due process expresses the requirement of "fundamental fairness," a requirement whose meaning can be as opaque as its importance is lofty. Applying the Due Process Clause is therefore an uncertain enterprise which must discover what "fundamental fairness" consists of in a particular situation by first considering any relevant precedents and then by assessing the several interests that are at stake. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 24-25. In Lassiter, the United States Supreme Court established the analytical framework for determining whether the procedures for termination proceedings satisfy due process. The phrase "due process," although incapable of precise definition, expresses the requirement of fundamental fairness. Id. at 24. What fundamental fairness requires in a particular situation is determined by "considering any relevant precedents and then . . . assessing the several interests that are at stake." Id. at 25.