In Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 156 L. Ed. 2d 508 (2003), the Supreme Court struck as unconstitutional a Texas statute prohibiting certain sexual activity between members of the same sex. Id. at 578. However, the Supreme Court stopped short of declaring that this liberty interest was a fundamental right. See id. at 572, 578 (applying a rational basis test rather than the strict scrutiny test for fundamental rights); see also id. at 594 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that majority did not identify right as fundamental); Standhardt v. Superior Ct., 206 Ariz. 276, 282, P19, 77 P.3d 451, 457 (App. 2003) (relying in part on Supreme Court's failure to identify right as fundamental in holding that state statutes prohibiting same-sex marriages are constitutional). The Supreme Court instead determined that the Texas statute prohibiting same-sex sexual practices, premised on moral objection to same-sex sexual practices, "furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual." Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. Moreover, the Supreme Court did not hold that the liberty interest that it accorded homosexuals in that instance extended to all private consensual sexual activity. Id. The Supreme Court expressly stated that its holding did not reach other forms of sexual activity, including public conduct and prostitution. Id. In Lawrence, the United States Supreme Court struck down a Texas statute prohibiting certain consensual sexual activity by members of the same sex. 539 U.S. at 578. However, the Supreme Court stopped short of declaring that this liberty interest was a fundamental right. See id. at 572, 578 The Supreme Court instead determined that the Texas statute prohibiting same-sex consensual sexual practices "furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual." Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.