In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) the United States Supreme Court analyzed a New York statute that granted cable-television companies the right to place their equipment on apartment buildings, and held that applying the statute to private property would effect a "taking" in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 421. The court struck down a statute requiring landlords to permit installation of cable equipment on their property. ( Loretto, supra, 458 U.S. 419.) The initial attachment of cable equipment to the Loretto plaintiff's property was expressly authorized by the Loretto plaintiff's predecessor in interest. ( Loretto, supra, 458 U.S. at p. 421 [102 S. Ct. at p. 3168].) Notwithstanding that fact, the Loretto court found the statute effected a physical taking of the Loretto plaintiff's property. The Court held that a permanent physical occupation of a property, no matter how small, is a constitutionally compensable taking. 458 U.S. at 426. Loretto concerned a New York state law that authorized a cable company to install cables and a cable box on plaintiff's apartment building. 458 U.S. at 421-22. Thus, the case involved a government regulation that expressly authorized physical occupation of private property. The issue before the Court was whether an otherwise valid regulation could so frustrate property rights that compensation must be paid to the property owner. Id. at 425-26. In its analysis, the Court carefully distinguished permanent physical occupations, in which it had always found a taking, from both temporary physical invasions short of an occupation and regulations restricting the use of private property. Id. at 428-34. The Court concluded that of the three, only a permanent physical occupation of property is a per se taking, "without regard to whether the action achieves an important public benefit or has only minimal economic impact on the owner." Id. at 434-35. Finding that the cable "installation involved a direct physical attachment of plates, boxes, wires, bolts, and screws to the building, completely occupying space immediately above and upon the roof and along the building's exterior wall," the Court concluded that the installation constituted a taking under the traditional physical occupation test. Id. at 438. The U.S. Supreme Court invalidated a New York statute that barred landlords from interfering with the installation of cable television facilities on their property or premises upon payment of a one-time $ 1 nominal fee by the tenant or cable company. In the fact pattern presented to the high court, a cable less than a half-inch wide in diameter and approximately 30 feet in length ran up the side of the building to the appellant-owner's roof. In a majority opinion delivered by Justice Thurgood Marshall, the Supreme Court overruled the New York State Court of Appeals and determined that the cable installation was a taking without just compensation because of the permanency of the physical occupation. Finding that the narrow width of the cable was inconsequential, the Court ruled that the "constitutional protection for the rights of private property cannot be made to depend on the size of the area permanently occupied." The Court reasoned that "a permanent physical occupation authorized by government is a taking without regard to the public interests that it may serve," and that "permanent occupations of land by such installations as telegraph and telephone lines . . . or wires are takings even if they occupy only relatively insubstantial amounts of space and do not seriously interfere with the landowner's use of the rest of his land." Id. at 426, 430. The Court also note that a number of federal courts, construing the Cable Communications Policy Act, have recognized the constitutional concerns that would arise from requiring private parties to grant property access to uninvited cable companies whenever a private easement has been granted to other specific service providers. See: (1) Cable Ariz. Corp. v. CoxCom, Inc., 261 F.3d 871, 876 (9th Cir. 2001); (2) TCI of N.D., Inc. v. Schriock Holding Co., 11 F.3d 812, 815 (8th Cir. 1993); (3) Cable Holdings of Ga., Inc. v. McNeil Real Estate Fund VI, Ltd., 953 F.2d 600, 604-05 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 862, 121 L. Ed. 2d 127, 113 S. Ct. 182 (1992); (4) Cable Invs., Inc. v. Woolley, 867 F.2d 151, 159-60 (3d Cir. 1989).