In Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159 (1985), the defendant was out on bail awaiting trial when he met with his co-defendant and suggested murdering one of the State's witnesses. The co-defendant decided to cooperate with the police. He recorded a conversation that he had with the defendant in which he indirectly elicited a number of incriminating statements from the defendant. The bulk of the comments involved the offense for which trial was pending; the defendant dropped the witness-murder idea as not being feasible. At the defendant's trial, the incriminating statements related to the offense were admitted, but not any of the statements related to the murder plot. The Supreme Court began with the acknowledgment that the right to counsel does not exist solely at trial - it applies before trial as well, when the adversary criminal proceedings have begun. Moulton, 474 U.S. at 170. The Court then noted that once the right to counsel has attached and been asserted, the State must honor it, meaning, "at the very least," that "the prosecutor and police have an affirmative obligation not to act in a manner that circumvents and thereby dilutes the protection afforded by the right to counsel." Id. at 170-71. The Court then reviewed Spano, Massiah, and Henry, emphasizing that "the Sixth Amendment is violated when the State obtains incriminating statements by knowingly circumventing the accused's right to have counsel present in a confrontation between the accused and a state agent." Id. at 171-76. The United States Supreme Court re-emphasized that after the initiation of formal charges, the Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused the right to rely on counsel as a "medium" between the State and the accused. This guarantee includes the State's affirmative obligation not to act in a manner that circumvents the protections accorded the accused by invoking this right. The Sixth Amendment is violated when the State obtains incriminating statements by knowingly circumventing the accused's right to have counsel present in a confrontation between the accused and a state agent. Id. Defendants Moulton and Colson were charged with four counts of theft. Moulton, 474 U.S. at 162. Moulton and Colson had several meetings to discuss their upcoming trial. At one of these meetings, Moulton suggested the possibility of killing one of the State's witnesses. Later, Colson secretly agreed to cooperate with the police in exchange for the government's promise to refrain from bringing any additional charges against him. Colson agreed to the secret recording of subsequent conversations between him and Moulton. At a strategy meeting between the two, Moulton and Colson discussed fabricating an alibi for the charged offenses. The two discussed the details of the thefts in order to develop an alibi that was believable. Claiming memory lapses about the incident, Colson prompted Moulton for additional details of the thefts. Id. The Supreme Court reaffirmed that "the Sixth Amendment is violated when the State obtains incriminating statements by knowingly circumventing the accused's right to have counsel present in a confrontation between the accused and a state agent. " ( Id. at p. 176.) The court rejected the argument that the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights were not violated because the defendant initiated a meeting with his codefendant which was taped by the police with the codefendant's help. It found the state has an "affirmative obligation not to act in a manner that circumvents the protections accorded the accused by invoking this right." ( Id. at p. 176.)