Marine Bank v. Weaver (1982) 455 U.S. 551 involved the question of whether either a certificate of deposit or a business agreement between two families could be considered a security under the federal Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The certificate of deposit was purchased by a couple, the Weavers, from a bank and was insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. It was also pledged as collateral for a loan from the same bank to guarantee a loan made by the bank to Columbus Packing Co. In addition to purchasing the certificate of deposit, the Weavers entered an agreement with the owners of Columbus, the Piccirillos, under the terms of which the Piccirillos agreed to pay the Weavers 50% of the net profits of the Columbus Packing Co. and $ 100 per month. (Id. at p. 553.) The Weavers acquired $ 50,000 worth of certificates of deposit from Marine Bank, and later pledged these certificates to guarantee a loan being made to a third-party slaughterhouse company. In consideration for the pledge of the certificates, the third party agreed to pay the Weavers $ 100 per month plus fifty percent of the slaughterhouse's net profits. Additionally, the Weavers were granted, as consideration for the pledged certificates, a right to use the third party's pasture and barn and the right to veto any future borrowing by the slaughterhouse company. Later, the slaughterhouse company went bankrupt and Marine Bank gave the Weavers notice of its intent to claim the pledged certificates of deposit. The Weavers filed a complaint alleging that Marine Bank had been aware of the slaughterhouse's precarious financial situation and had violated both state and federal securities laws by inducing the Weavers to pledge the certificates. The high court found that the federal securities laws did not apply to the certificate of deposit because it was issued by a federally regulated bank and subject to regulations governing banks. (Marine Bank, supra, 455 U.S. at p. 558.) The court also found that the unique contract between the Weavers and Piccirillos was not a security. (Id. at p. 560.) The court contrasted the agreement from other cases in which securities were found as follows: "The unusual instruments found to constitute securities in prior cases involved offers to a number of potential investors, not a private transaction as in this case." (Id. at p. 559.) "The Piccirillos distributed no prospectus to the Weavers or to other potential investors, and the unique agreement they negotiated was not designed to be traded publicly." (Id. at p. 560.) The Marine Bank court, however, did not hold that no business agreement between transacting parties could constitute a security. (Id. at p. 561, fn.11.) Instead, it made clear that "each transaction must be analyzed and evaluated on the basis of the content of the instruments in question, the purposes intended to be served, and the factual setting as a whole." (Ibid.) The United States Supreme Court held that, because the certificates of deposit were insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, there was no need for the additional protection afforded by the securities laws. Marine Bank, 455 U.S. at 556-59. The Supreme Court also determined that the separate agreement between the Weavers and the third party was not an investment contract or other form of security. The Court noted that the transaction was not the type "that comes to mind when the term 'security' is used and does not fall within 'the ordinary concept of a security'" Id. at 559. In reaching this conclusion, the Court considered prior cases where unusual instruments had been found to be securities, but observed that the "prior cases involved offers to a number of potential investors" as opposed to private transactions. Id. The Court also deemed it significant that the instruments in these prior cases were subject to "common trading," and "had equivalent values to most persons and could have been traded publicly." Id. at 560.