In Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990), police obtained arrest warrants for Buie and his alleged accomplice in an armed robbery, proceeded to Buie's home, entered the residence and apprehended Buie as he "emerged from the basement." Id. at 328. Police then "entered the basement 'in case there was someone else' down there" and observed and seized a "red running suit," clothing allegedly worn by a perpetrator of the robbery. Id. In reversing a decision of the Court of Appeals of Maryland that suppressed the evidence, the Supreme Court defined a "'protective sweep' . . . as a quick and limited search of premises, incident to an arrest," a "narrowly confined . . . cursory visual inspection of those places in which a person might be hiding," and approved the procedure to insure "the safety of police officers and others." Id. at 327. In Maryland v. Buie, the defendant and another man robbed a restaurant. One of the robbers was wearing a red jogging suit. Police obtained an arrest warrant for the defendant and executed it at his house. There, one officer shouted into the basement for everyone to come up. When the defendant did so, he was promptly arrested. Another officer then entered the basement '"in case there was someone else" down there.' (Buie, supra, 494 U.S. at p. 328.) In plain view the officer saw a red jogging suit, which he seized. (Ibid.) Charged with the restaurant robbery, the defendant moved to suppress the jogging suit. The trial court denied the motion. That ruling was overturned by the Maryland Court of Appeals, that state's highest tribunal, which invalidated the search because the officers lacked probable cause to search the basement. (Id. at p. 329.) That decision, in turn, was vacated by the United States Supreme Court, which concluded that the probable cause standard did not apply to a 'protective sweep.' (Id. at p. 327.) The court explained that as an incident to an arrest 'the officers could, as a precautionary matter and without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, look in closets and other spaces immediately adjoining the place of arrest from which an attack could be launched.' . . . But it stressed that beyond that, an inspection undertaken outside the immediate area of the arrest must be supported by 'articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, would warrant a reasonably prudent officer in believing that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene.' (Buie, supra, at p. 334.) The high court then remanded the case to the Maryland Court of Appeals to reconsider whether the prosecution's evidence at the suppression hearing was sufficient to justify the officer's entry into the basement as a 'protective sweep' under the reasonable suspicion standard articulated in Buie. (Id. at p. 337.) In authorizing the protective sweep of the defendant's house in Buie, supra, 494 U.S. 325, the high court drew on principles set out in Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1. That decision allowed officers, incident to an on-the-street detention, to conduct 'a limited patdown for weapons where a reasonably prudent officer would be warranted in the belief, based on "specific and articulable facts," and not on a mere "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch,'" "that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual."' (Buie, supra, at p. 332, quoting Terry v. Ohio, supra, at pp. 21, 27.) Buie recognized that with 'an arrest in the home,' there existed 'an analogous interest of the officers in taking steps to assure themselves that the house in which a suspect is being, or has just been, arrested is not harboring other persons who are dangerous and who could unexpectedly launch an attack.' (Id. at p. 333.) The Buie court took pains to underscore the limited nature of a protective sweep, a nature circumscribed by its purpose: "We should emphasize that such a protective sweep, aimed at protecting the arresting officers, if justified by the circumstances, is nevertheless not a full search of the premises, but may extend only to a cursory inspection of those spaces where a person may be found. The sweep lasts no longer than is necessary to dispel the reasonable suspicion of danger and in any event no longer than it takes to complete the arrest and depart the premises." (Buie, supra, 494 U.S. 325, 335-336.) The Supreme Court found that this was inadequate to justify a protective sweep: "Officer Strain testified that the officers had on April 26 and 27, 2000 conducted a surveillance of defendant's house on A Street in San Diego. During that time, the officers noted the presence of defendant's wife and 'possibly a male juvenile' in the home. But when on the afternoon of April 27th the officers entered defendant's house for a protective sweep just moments after detaining defendant in his backyard as he rolled a large truck tire toward Ordaz's waiting truck in the alley, they had no knowledge of the presence of anyone in defendant's house. As the trial court found, the officers 'had not been keeping track of who was in the house'; thus, when they entered the house to conduct a protective sweep, they did so without 'any information as to whether anyone was inside the house.' Also, there is no indication that when stopped by the officers, either defendant or Ordaz was armed. Moreover, until defendant later consented to a search of the large truck tire he was rolling from the back door of his house toward the alley, the officers were unaware that the tire (like the similar tires found in the two Los Angeles County investigations we discussed earlier) had been cut open and then resealed to conceal cocaine. The facts known to the officers before they performed the protective sweep fell short of what Buie requires, that is, 'articulable facts' considered together with the rational inferences drawn from those facts, that would warrant a reasonably prudent officer to entertain a reasonable suspicion that the area to be swept harbors a person posing a danger to officer safety.' (Buie, supra, 494 U.S. at pp.327, 334.) The United States Supreme Court differentiated between two types of protective sweeps pursuant to a lawful arrest. In "Type I" searches, the Court held that incident to a lawful arrest the officers could, "as a precautionary measure and without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, look in closets and other spaces immediately adjoining the place of arrest from which an attack could be immediately launched." Buie, 494 U.S. at 334. In order to search further--a "Type II" search--"there must be articulable facts which taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, would warrant a reasonable and prudent officer in believing that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene." Id. In Maryland v. Buie, the United States Supreme Court considered whether the Fourth Amendment would permit officers to conduct a protective sweep incident to an arrest. Buie, 494 U.S. at 329. The defendant in Buie committed an armed robbery with an accomplice, and the police placed the defendant's house under surveillance. When the officers entered defendant's house with a warrant to arrest him, they located the defendant in the basement. The officers continued to search the basement "'in case there was someone else' down there." While in the basement, an officer found evidence linking defendant to the offense. See Buie, 494 U.S. at 329. The trial court denied the defendant's motion to suppress because the officers did not know if anyone was in the basement, and the defendant was charged with a serious offense. The officers had no other way to know if the defendant had accomplices hiding in the basement. The United States Supreme Court began its analysis with the basic premise that "the Fourth Amendment bars only unreasonable searches and seizures." Buie, 494 U.S. at 331. To determine whether a search is reasonable, the individual's Fourth Amendment privacy interest is balanced with the promotion of legitimate governmental interests. Under this balancing test, a search of a house is "generally not reasonable without a warrant issued on probable cause," but may nevertheless be permitted when a strong public interest exists for the search. Id. The Buie Court concluded that the defendant had a legitimate privacy interest in the areas of his house searched after he was located. It also found, however, that the police officers had a strong interest in "taking steps to assure themselves that the house in which a suspect is being, or has just been arrested is not harboring other persons who are dangerous and who could unexpectedly launch an attack." Buie, 494 U.S. at 333. The Supreme Court determined that a warrant was not required when officers were, as a precautionary matter, looking in areas from which an attack could be immediately launched. See Buie, 494 U.S. at 334. The Supreme Court held that after apprehending the person named in the arrest warrant, police officers may conduct a protective sweep of the residence to search for other individuals beyond spaces immediately adjoining the place of arrest. The officers are authorized to conduct such a protective sweep if they have a reasonable suspicion that the residence harbors other individuals posing a danger to the officers. Id. at 334. The Court did not require a reasonable suspicion that these other individuals are involved in criminal activity. The Supreme Court pointed out that the Fourth Amendment prohibits only unreasonable searches and seizures, reasonableness is determined by balancing the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests, and under this test it is generally not reasonable to search a house without a warrant issued on probable cause. The Court noted that there are "other contexts, however, where the public interest is such that neither a warrant nor probable cause is required." ( Id. at p. 331.) The Court found that the two most instructive cases for its purposes were Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, and Michigan v. Long (1983) 463 U.S. 1032,. In Terry, the Court permitted police officers to pat down a suspect for weapons without a warrant or probable cause and in Long, the Court permitted police officers to search a vehicle for weapons without a warrant or probable cause. In both cases the search required specific and articulable facts which taken together with reasonable inferences therefrom which would reasonably warrant an officer in believing that the suspect was armed and dangerous or might gain immediate control of a weapon. ( Maryland v. Buie, supra, 494 U.S. at pp. 331-332.) In both cases the permissible search was limited, in Terry to the outer garments of the suspect and in Long to the passenger compartment of the vehicle. (Ibid.) In Buie, the Court extended the rulings of Terry and Long to "a house in which a suspect is being, or has just been, arrested." ( Maryland v. Buie, supra, 494 U.S. at p. 333.) The Court explained that "unlike an encounter on the street or along a highway, an in-home arrest puts the officer at the disadvantage of being on his adversary's 'turf.' An ambush in a confined setting of unknown configuration is more to be feared than it is in open, more familiar surroundings." ( Id. at p. 333.) The Court limited the search to "a cursory inspection of those spaces where a person may be found" which "lasts no longer than is necessary to dispel the reasonable suspicion of danger." ( Id. at pp. 335-336.)