In Maryland v. Garrison (1987) 480 U.S. 79, police officers obtained a warrant to search the person of Lawrence McWebb and "'the premises known as 2036 Park Avenue third floor apartment.'" (Garrison, supra, 480 U.S. at p. 80.) When the police officer applied for the warrant, he reasonably believed there was only one apartment on the premises described in the warrant. (Id. at p. 81.) In fact, the premises described in the warrant were divided into two apartments, one occupied by McWebb and the other occupied by Garrison. (Id. at p. 80.) While executing the warrant, as the police officers entered the vestibule on the third floor, they could see into McWebb's apartment to the left and into Garrison's apartment to the right. (Id. at p. 81.) Only after entering Garrison's apartment and finding heroin, cash, and drug paraphernalia did the officers realize the third floor had two apartments. (Ibid.) At that moment, they discontinued the search. (Ibid.) The Supreme Court addressed two issues: (1) was the warrant invalid because the description of the place to be searched was overbroad, and (2) did the manner of executing the warrant violate Garrison's Fourth Amendment rights. (Garrison, supra, 480 U.S. at pp. 84, 86.) On the first issue, the court concluded the warrant was constitutionally valid despite the mistake in describing the premises to be searched. (Id. at p. 86.) The validity of the warrant and constitutionality of the police officers' conduct must be assessed based on the information the officers disclosed, or had a duty to discover and disclose, to the magistrate issuing the warrant. (Id. at p. 85.) Before seeking the warrant, the police officer verified information obtained from a reliable informant, made an exterior examination of the building at the address identified in the warrant, and made an inquiry of the utility company. (Id. at p. 81.) The officer reasonably concluded on the basis of that information there was only one apartment on the third floor and it was occupied by McWebb. (Ibid.) On the second issue, the Supreme Court concluded execution of the warrant did not violate Garrison's Fourth Amendment rights. The officers' failure to recognize the warrant's overbreadth was objectively reasonable based on facts suggesting no distinction between McWebb's apartment and Garrison's apartment, and "prior to the officers' discovery of the factual mistake, they perceived McWebb's apartment and the third-floor premises as one and the same . . . ." (Garrison, supra, 480 U.S. at p. 88.) Therefore, the officers' execution of the warrant reasonably included the entire third floor. (Id. at pp. 86, 88.) The limits of the search were based on information available as the search progressed: Once the officers realized the third floor contained two apartments, they were obligated to, and did, discontinue the search. (Id. at p. 87.) The Supreme Court concluded that suppression of the contraband was not required because the warrant was valid when issued and the officers did not know at the time of the search that the premises contained separate units. (Garrison, at p. 86.) But, "if the officers had known, or should have known, that the third floor contained two apartments before they entered the living quarters on the third floor, and thus had been aware of the error in the warrant, they would have been obligated to limit their search to McWebb's apartment." (Id. at pp. 86-87.)