In McDermott v. Wisconsin (1913) 228 U.S. 115, the Supreme Court struck down a Wisconsin statute which prohibited the sale of cans of a mixture of glucose and refiners' syrup unless it met specified content (glucose in a proportion exceeding 75 percent by weight) and labeling requirements ("'Glucose flavored with Maple Syrup,' 'Glucose flavored with Sugar-cane Syrup,' 'Glucose flavored with Refiners' Syrup,'"). The plaintiff, a Wisconsin retail merchant, purchased cans of the mixture from a wholesale merchant in Chicago and placed those cans on its own shelves for resale. The cans bore labels which did not meet the standards specified under Wisconsin law but were in accordance with the federal food and drugs act and had been expressly approved by federal regulators pursuant to that act. The federal act prohibited the introduction into interstate commerce any article of food or drugs which was adulterated or misbranded. The federal statute defined the terms "adulterated" and "misbranded", setting forth the requirements for labeling in compliance with federal law. (228 U.S. at pp. 126-127.) First addressing the power of Congress to regulate in this area, the high court found the purpose of the federal statute is to prevent the misuse of the facilities of interstate commerce by protecting consumers from deceptive branding and adulterated food and drugs. That purpose is met when the federally approved labels are on the articles of food or medicine when they reach the consumer. Thus, the court concluded the requirements of the act were clearly within the power of Congress over interstate commerce. (228 U.S. at pp. 128-129.) The court then found that while the state is permitted to regulate with "a view to the protection of its people against fraud or imposition by impure food or drugs. . . . it is equally well settled that the state may not, under the guise of exercising its police power or otherwise, impose burdens upon or discriminate against interstate commerce, nor may it enact legislation in conflict with the statutes of Congress passed for the regulation of the subject, and if it does, to the extent that the state law interferes with or frustrates the operation of the acts of Congress, its provisions must yield to the superior Federal power given to Congress by the Constitution." ( Id. at pp. 131-132 at p. 766.) The court reasoned that to permit Wisconsin to regulate in the manner it chose, "is to permit a state to discredit and burden legitimate Federal regulations of interstate commerce, to destroy rights arising out of the Federal statute which have accrued both to the government and the shipper, and to impair the effect of a Federal law which has been enacted under the Constitutional power of Congress over the subject." ( Id. at pp. 133-134 57 L. Ed. at pp. 766-767.) The court therefore concluded that to require the removal or destruction of the federally approved labels before the goods are sold is beyond the power of the state. "The Wisconsin act which permits the sale of articles subject to the regulations of interstate commerce only upon condition that they contain the exclusive labels required by the statute is an act in excess of its legitimate power." ( Id. at pp. 134.)