In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania (1971) 403 U.S. 528, the plurality observed that the arguments there for a jury trial "necessarily equate the juvenile proceeding--or at least the adjudicative phase of it--with the criminal trial." (McKeiver, supra, 403 U.S. at p. 550.) Put another way, "the arguments advanced by the juveniles ... are, of course, the identical arguments that underlie the demand for the jury trial for criminal proceedings." (Ibid.) The McKeiver court rejected the comparison, with the plurality observing it ignored "every aspect of fairness, of concern, of sympathy, and of paternal attention that the juvenile court system contemplates"--in other words, the informal, rehabilitative, and parens patriae nature of the system. (Ibid.) Focusing on the rehabilitative nature of a "typical disposition in the juvenile court" that might, for example, authorize confinement until age 21 but "no longer and within that period ... only so long as his behavior demonstrates that he remains an unacceptable risk if returned to his family," Justice White similarly distinguished the juvenile adjudicatory system from a criminal trial. (Id. at p. 552.) In sum, "Not only are those risks that mandate juries in criminal cases of lesser magnitude in juvenile court adjudications, but the consequences of adjudication are less severe than those flowing from verdicts of criminal guilt. This is plainly so in theory, and in practice there remains a substantial gulf between criminal guilt and delinquency ... ." (Id. at p. 553.) The Supreme Court held the right to a jury trial does not generally apply in juvenile delinquency adjudications. The Attorney General relies on McKeiver's holding as a blanket proposition that the right is never constitutionally required under any circumstances in a delinquency matter. But the McKeiver plurality expressly recognized "disillusionment" might "come one day" concerning trial of a juvenile without a jury. (McKeiver, supra, 403 U.S. at p. 551.) McKeiver consisted of consolidated cases from Pennsylvania and North Carolina with dispositions. In all but one of the consolidated cases, the courts returned the juveniles to their homes. None, apparently, received any legal punishment. Specifically, the Pennsylvania juvenile court adjudicated the named appellant, McKeiver, a delinquent on felony charges of robbery, larceny, and receiving stolen goods, and placed him on probation. The same court committed another appellant to a youth development center after consecutive adjudications for assault on a teacher and misdemeanor assault and battery of a police officer, and conspiracy. (McKeiver, supra, 403 U.S. at pp. 534-536; see id. at p. 558 (dis. opn. of Douglas, J.).) The North Carolina cases involved approximately 45 black children, ages 11 to 15, summoned to juvenile court following demonstrations in late 1968 concerning school assignments and a school consolidation plan; they were each charged with misdemeanor traffic obstruction. Another North Carolina petitioner faced charges of disorderly conduct in a public building and interruption or disturbance of a public or private school. (McKeiver, supra, 403 U.S. at pp. 536-538; see id. at p. 558 (dis. opn. of Douglas, J.).) All the North Carolina petitioners were adjudged delinquent in closed proceedings and initially ordered committed to the custody of county welfare authorities for placement in a "suitable institution," but the juvenile court suspended its commitment order and placed the children on probation for a year or two each. (McKeiver, at p. 538.) The North Carolina Supreme Court "deleted that portion of the order in each case relating to commitment, but otherwise affirmed." (Ibid.)