McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986) involved a statute that required a mandatory minimum sentence if a trial court found by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant "visibly possessed a firearm" during the course of an offense, but gave the court no discretion to impose a lesser sentence for the underlying felony. Id., at 81-82. The United States Supreme Court held that there was no denial of the defendant's right to a jury trial and deemed the statute to be one dealing with a sentencing factor. Id., at 91. Because the statute was a sentencing consideration only, due process was satisfied by the court's finding by a preponderance of the evidence of "visible possession." Id., at 91-92. The United States Supreme Court considered a challenge to Pennsylvania's Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. 9712 (1982), which subjected defendants convicted of certain felonies to a mandatory minimum sentence of five years' imprisonment if the sentencing judge found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant "visibly possessed a firearm" during the commission of the underlying felony. A separate sentencing statute mandated that the court "shall impose a minimum sentence of confinement which shall not exceed one-half of the maximum sentence imposed." 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. 9756(b) (1982). Construing 9712 and 9756(b) together, the shortest maximum term permissible under the Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act would be 10 years. The enumerated felonies listed in the Act consisted of felonies of the first degree, carrying a maximum penalty of 20 years' imprisonment, and of the second degree, carrying a maximum penalty of 10 years' imprisonment. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 87, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 77; see 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. 9712, 9756(b). The statute thus operated "to divest the judge of discretion to impose any sentence of less than five years for the underlying felony," but did not "authorize a sentence in excess of that otherwise allowed for that offense." McMillan, 477 U.S. at 81-82, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 73. The high court considered a mandatory minimum sentencing law that required trial courts to impose a five-year minimum prison term on defendants who possessed a firearm in the commission of certain felonies. This five-year term did not, however, exceed the statutory maximum for any of the covered crimes. ( Id. at pp. 81-82.) Noting that the Pennsylvania Legislature expressly intended firearm possession to be a "sentencing factor that comes into play only after the defendant has been found guilty of one of the enumerated crimes," the court held that such sentencing factors need not be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. (Id. at pp. 80, 85-91) In McMillan v. Pennsylvania, a Pennsylvania statute provided for a mandatory minimum five-year prison sentence where the sentencing judge found that the defendant "visibly possessed a firearm" during the commission of the offense. The standard of proof was a preponderance of evidence and the judge's finding was to be based on evidence adduced at the trial plus any additional evidence offered at the sentencing hearing. ( Id. at p. 81.) The Supreme Court rejected a constitutional attack on the above scheme, noting that the statute "neither alters the maximum penalty for the crime committed nor creates a separate offense calling for a separate penalty; it operates solely to limit the sentencing court's discretion in selecting a penalty within the range already available to it without the special finding . . . ." (477 U.S. at pp. 87-88.) In rejecting the petitioners' claim that the statute denied them their Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury, the high court concluded the point "merits little discussion" since "there is no Sixth Amendment right to jury sentencing, even where the sentence turns on specific findings of fact." ( Id. at p. 93.)The Court upheld the constitutionality of a Pennsylvania statute which required the sentencing judge to impose a five year minimum sentence where the judge found by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant "was visibly possessed of a firearm" when committing one of certain enumerated felonies. Key to the Court's decision was that the Pennsylvania law "neither alters the maximum penalty for the crime committed nor creates a separate offense calling for a separate penalty;" instead, "it operates solely to limit the sentencing court's discretion in selecting a penalty within the range already available to it without the special finding of visible possession of a firearm." McMillan, 477 U.S. at 87-88. In the course of also rejecting the defendants' contention that a clear and convincing standard of proof should apply, if not the beyond a reasonable doubt standard, the Court observed: "Sentencing courts necessarily consider the circumstances of an offense in selecting the appropriate punishment, and we have consistently approved sentencing schemes that mandate consideration of facts related to the crime . . . without suggesting that those facts must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt . . . ." McMillan, 477 U.S. at 92. In McMillan v. Pennsylvania, the enhanced sentence was a mandatory minimum within the maximum sentence for the substantive crime. Id. at 83. This proved key to the Court's eventual decision to uphold the Pennsylvania statute. The statute operated "to limit the sentencing court's discretion in selecting a penalty within the range already available to it without the special finding" of the enhancing factor. Id. at 87-88. Because the enhanced sentence was within the statutory maximum for the substantive offense, the factual determination forming the basis for the enhancement did not act as "a tail which wags the dog of the substantive offense." Id. at 88. But the issue before us here is precisely the opposite of that in McMillan. Instead of an enhanced sentence within the statutory maximum for the substantive offense, the POAA mandates an enhanced sentence in excess of that provided for the substantive offense. On such a scenario the McMillan Court also spoke: Petitioners' claim that visible possession of a firearm under the Pennsylvania statute is "really" an element of the offenses for which they are being punished . . . would have at least more superficial appeal if a finding of visible possession exposed them to greater or additional punishment . . . .Id. The sentence enhancement issue in McMillan centered on a mandatory minimum sentence based on a finding of visible possession of a firearm. Id. at 81. The petitioners argued possession of a firearm was an element of the substantive crime for which they were being sentenced, wherefore due process required this fact be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 83, 84.