In Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009), authorities arrested the defendant in possession of bags containing a substance that resembled cocaine. (Id. at p. 2530.) At trial, the prosecution placed into evidence the bags seized from the defendant and submitted three '"certificates of analysis"' showing the results of the forensic analysis performed on the seized substances. The certificates, which were prepared almost a week after the testing of the substance occurred, reported the weight of the seized bags and stated that the substance inside the bags '"was found to contain: Cocaine."' (Id. at pp. 2531, 2535.) The certificates were sworn to before a notary public by analysts at the state's department of health laboratory, as required by Massachusetts law. (Ibid.) Further, under Massachusetts law, "the sole purpose of the affidavits was to provide 'prima facie evidence of the composition, quality, and the net weight' of the analyzed substance . . . ." (Id. at p. 2532.) The defendant was charged with cocaine distribution. The prosecution introduced certificates prepared by a laboratory analyst and sworn to before a notary public. The certificates stated the substance found in plastic bags was cocaine. The Supreme Court held the certificates constituted testimonial hearsay, and thus were inadmissible under Crawford v. Washington. (Melendez-Diaz, at p. 310.) The court stated the certificates were: (1) a solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact; (2) functionally identical to live, in-court testimony; (3) made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that it would be available for use at a later trial; (4) created "to provide 'prima facie evidence of the composition, quality, and the net weight' of the . . . substance found in the plastic bags seized from the defendant's car." (Id. at pp. 310-311.) A laboratory's certificates of analysis were introduced as evidence in a prosecution for cocaine distribution and trafficking. The certificates were sworn statements that laboratory testing had shown a substance recovered from defendant's car was cocaine. (Id. at p. 308.) The court found the certificates were affidavits and, thus, testimonial. (Id. at p. 310.) The majority opinion noted that the certificates, which affirmed that the substance examined by the lab was in fact cocaine, served the same purpose that live testimony from the examiners would have and that the examiners would have been aware that the sworn statements they were making would have been used for prosecution. (Id. at pp. 310-311.) In his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas stated: "'The Confrontation Clause is implicated by extrajudicial statements only insofar as they are contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions.'" (Melendez-Diaz, supra, 557 U.S. at p. 329, (conc. opn. of Thomas, J.).) Justice Thomas concurred in the court's opinion because he regarded the certificate as an affidavit. (Id. at p. 330 (conc. opn. of Thomas, J.).) The issue was whether certificates of analysis that showed the results of forensic analysis performed on controlled substances were testimonial in nature and thus inadmissible unless the analysts themselves testified at trial. Id. at 2530-2531 (I). The Court held that the admission of the certificates without the analysts' testimony violated the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 2532 (II). Melendez-Diaz explained that " documents kept in the regular course of business may ordinarily be admitted at trial despite their hearsay status. The United States Supreme Court determined that the sworn certificates (affidavits) of state crime laboratory analysts admitted into evidence to prove material seized by police was contraband were "testimonial" in nature (testimonial evidence) and thus defendant's Sixth Amendment confrontation clause rights were violated when the analysts who wrote the reports did not testify in person at trial. The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, held that these certificates of analysis were "quite plainly affidavits" and thus, "within the 'core class of testimonial statements,'" subject to the confrontation restrictions in Crawford v. Washington. (Melendez-Diaz, supra, 129 S.Ct. at p. 2532.) Because the certificates were testimonial in nature, the defendant was entitled to confront the analysts who signed them absent a showing that the analysts were unavailable to testify at trial and that the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine them. (Ibid.) At the conclusion of its decision, the majority noted that its holding in Melendez-Diaz was "little more than the application of its holding in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36" because the certificates in question were simply "ex parte out-of-court-affidavits," which the prosecution could not rely on to prove its case. (Melendez-Diaz, supra, at p. 2542.) The defendant was charged under state law with distributing and trafficking in cocaine. At trial, the prosecution introduced into evidence "certificates of analysis" showing the results of the forensic analysis of the substances seized from the defendant. The certificates stated the substances were cocaine. The defendant objected to the admission into evidence of the certificates, contending that, under Crawford v. Washington, the confrontation clause required the analyst of the substances testify in person and be subject to cross-examination. The defendant's objection was overruled, he was convicted by jury and his conviction affirmed through the state court appellate system, which held that the "authors of certificates of forensic analysis are not subject to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment." Melendez concluded the certificates of forensic analysis were testimonial hearsay statements under Crawford v. Washington because they contained the same testimony the analysts would provide if called as witnesses at trial. The purpose for which the certificates were prepared was to establish at trial the nature of the substances seized from the defendant and for that purpose were introduced as evidence at trial. (Ibid.) Therefore, "absent a showing that the analysts were unavailable to testify at trial and that defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine them, defendant was entitled to '"be confronted with"' the analysts at trial." (Ibid.) Melendez also concluded that to constitute testimonial hearsay, the certificates did not have to be accusatory in the sense they did not directly accuse the defendant of a crime. It is sufficient that the certificates provided testimony against or adverse to the defendant; they proved a fact necessary for the defendant's conviction. Furthermore, Melendez rejected the arguments the certificates were not testimonial hearsay because they did not describe events observed in the past but rather nearly contemporaneous observations of the test of the nature of the substances; they contained neither observations of the crime nor any human conduct related to the crime; and they were not in response to interrogation. Melendez also rejected the argument the certificates were not testimonial hearsay subject to the confrontation clause because they were types of business records admissible at common law even though hearsay. The court stated: "Documents kept in the regular course of business may ordinarily be admitted at trial despite their hearsay status. But that is not the case if the regularly conducted business activity is the production of evidence for use at trial... . The analysts' certificates--like police reports generated by law enforcement officials--do not qualify as business or public records ..." because they are produced for use in court, not for the regular business of the entity producing them. (Ibid.) In Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts (2009) a five-to-four decision, the United States Supreme Court held that ?certificates of analysis" sworn to by prosecution laboratory analysts before a notary public and showing that seized evidence was cocaine, were testimonial under Crawford v. Washington. Noting that the certificates of analysis were in substance "affidavits," and that affidavits were expressly included in Crawford v. Washington's description of the "'core class of testimonial statements,'" the majority in Melendez-Diaz found "little doubt" that the certificates were testimonial. Justice Thomas provided the decisive fifth vote, and authored a concurring opinion in which he explained that he "continued to adhere to his position that 'the Confrontation Clause is implicated by extrajudicial statements only insofar as they are contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions.'" (conc. opn. of Thomas, J.) He "joined the Court's opinion in this case because the documents at issue in this case 'are quite plainly affidavits,'. As such, they 'fall within the core class of testimonial statements' governed by the Confrontation Clause. " (Ibid. (conc. opn. of Thomas, J.).) In Melendez-Diaz, the majority dismissed the contention of the respondent and the four dissenters that there is a distinction, for confrontation clause purposes, between a "conventional witness" who testifies to past events and is subject to confrontation, and the report of an "analyst" who makes near contemporaneous observations of neutral, scientific test results, and thus is not subject to confrontation. Nonetheless, because of the limited nature of Justice Thomas's concurrence, the precedential value of the majority's analysis on this point is unclear as applied to a laboratory analyst's report or a similar forensic report, rather than to, in Justice Thomas's words, "'formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions.'" The Supreme Court held that the admission of certificates of analysis, offered by the prosecution in a drug trial, stating that the substance seized was cocaine of a certain quantity, violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him. 129 S. Ct. at 2530-32. The Court found that the certificates were testimonial, and accordingly, the prosecutor was required to call the analysts to testify at trial, absent their unavailability and a prior opportunity to cross-examine them. Id. The Supreme Court noted, however, that "we do not hold, and it is not the case, that anyone whose testimony may be relevant in establishing the chain of custody, authenticity of the sample, or accuracy of the testing device, must appear in person as part of the prosecution's case. . . . Additionally, documents prepared in the regular course of equipment maintenance may well qualify as nontestimonial records." Id. at 2532 n.1. The Melendez-Diaz decision accordingly did not overrule our holding in Bohsancurt v. Eisenberg that the Intoxilyzer calibration and quality assurance records are nontestimonial, and instead expressly noted that it would not go so far as to say these types of records were testimonial. See id. In Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, the United States Supreme Court revisited the issue of what constitutes a "testimonial" statement. The court held that three "certificates of analysis," which showed that seized substances contained cocaine, were testimonial statements subject to Sixth Amendment protection because they were made under oath and under circumstances that would lead an objective witness to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial (Id. at p. 129 S.Ct. at p. 2532.) The court observed that the certificates "are incontrovertibly a ' "solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact," ' " namely that the substance found in defendant and his codefendants' possession was cocaine. (Ibid.) The court rejected the argument that a lab analyst's report is not testimonial because it contains "near-contemporaneous" observations of a scientific test, rather than statements by lay witnesses of events observed in the past. (Id. at p. 129 S.Ct. at p. 2535.) It also rejected a related argument that there is a difference between testimony recounting past events, "which is 'prone to distortion and manipulation,' " and testimony that is the result of " 'neutral, scientific testing.' " (Id. at p. 129 S.Ct. at p. 2536.) The United States Supreme Court held that a certificate of forensic drug analysis issued under Massachusetts law was testimonial and therefore inadmissible under the confrontation clause. (Melendez-Diaz, supra, 129 S.Ct. at p. 2532.) The certificates, the court explained, were "functionally identical to live, in-court testimony, doing 'precisely what a witness does on direct examination.' " (Ibid.) The Melendez-Diaz court specifically rejected the argument that scientific "analysts are not subject to confrontation because they are not 'accusatory' witnesses . . . ." (Id. at pp. 2533-2534.) The Melendez-Diaz court also emphasized that whether the statement is a contemporaneous recordation of observable events must be viewed in the context of whether an objective witness would reasonably believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial. Lastly, the court rejected the argument that the certificates were outside the scope of the confrontation clause "because they are 'akin to the types of official and business records admissible at common law.'" (Melendez-Diaz, supra, at p. 2538.) After reiterating the Crawford v. Washington court's comment that coroner's reports have not been accorded any special status for purposes of the confrontation clause, the Melendez-Diaz court explained that business records are nontestimonial only if they were "created for the administration of an entity's affairs and not for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact at trial . . . ." (Melendez-Diaz, supra, at pp. 2539-2540.) The United States Supreme Court held that a certificate of forensic drug analysis issued under Massachusetts law was testimonial and therefore inadmissible under the confrontation clause. (Melendez-Diaz, supra, 129 S.Ct. at p. 2532.) The certificates, the court explained, were "functionally identical to live, in-court testimony, doing 'precisely what a witness does on direct examination.' " (Ibid.) The court specifically rejected the argument that scientific "analysts are not subject to confrontation because they are not 'accusatory' witnesses . . . ." (Id. at pp. 2533-2534.) The court also rejected the argument that the certificates were outside the scope of the confrontation clause "because they are 'akin to the types of official and business records admissible at common law.'" (Id. at p. 2538.) After reiterating the Crawford v. Washington court's comment that coroner's reports have not been accorded any special status for purposes of the confrontation clause, the Melendez-Diaz court explained that business records are nontestimonial only if they were "created for the administration of an entity's affairs and not for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact at trial . . . ." (Melendez-Diaz, supra, at pp. 2539-2540.)