Michigan v. Lucas

In Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145 (1991), the Supreme Court reversed a decision of the Michigan Court of Appeals that had held the state's notice and hearing procedure--which is comparable to our section 782--was per se unconstitutional when applied to past sexual conduct between the defendant and the complaining witness. There, defense counsel had failed to give the statutory notice of intent to inquire into the witness's past sexual history. ( Michigan, supra, 500 U.S. at p. 146.) Factually, Michigan has no application here as the notice issue is not before us. Significant to our analysis, the Supreme Court reminded that, even when a trial court's evidentiary ruling diminishes a defendant's right to present relevant evidence and to confront adverse witnesses, defendant's Sixth Amendment rights are not necessarily infringed. ( Id. at p. 149.) "We have explained, for example that 'trial judges retain wide latitude' to limit reasonably a criminal defendant's right to cross-examine a witness 'based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.' " (Ibid.) The Michigan statute, the court stated, represented "a valid legislative determination that rape victims deserve heightened protection against surprise, harassment and unnecessary invasions of privacy. . . ." ( Id. at p. 150.) The Supreme Court recognized that a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights may be constitutionally limited by a rape shield statute. Lucas, 500 U.S. at 149. "To the extent that the rape shield statute operates to prevent a criminal defendant from presenting relevant evidence, the defendant's ability to confront adverse witnesses and present a defense is diminished. This does not necessarily render the statute unconstitutional." Id. While a defendant's rights may be narrowed, the Court remarked that such restrictions "'may not be arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve."' Id. at 151. The Court noted that rape shield statutes represent a valid legislative determination that rape victims deserve heightened protection against harassment, surprise, unnecessary invasions of privacy, and undue delay. Id. at 149-50. The Court that the notice-and-hearing requirement of a rape shield statute serves a legitimate state interest in protecting against the harassment of a victim. 500 U.S. at 152-53. As the Court wrote, because a rape shield statute is "designed to protect victims of rape from being exposed at trial to harassing or irrelevant questions concerning their past sexual behavior," id. at 146, it "represents a valid legislative determination that rape victims deserve heightened protection against surprise, harassment, and unnecessary invasions of privacy." Id. at 150. Thus, rape shield statutes have endured due process and Sixth Amendment challenges because "the Sixth amendment does not confer the right to present testimony free from the legitimate demands of the adversarial system." United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 241, 45 L. Ed. 2d 141, 95 S. Ct. 2160 (1975); see Joel E. Smith, Annotation, Constitutionality of "Rape Shield Statute" Restricting Use of Evidence of Victim's Sexual Experiences, 1 ALR 4th 283 (1980 & 1999 Supp.).