Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co

In Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co. (1990) 497 U.S. 1, the court announced that there is no separate constitutional privilege for anything that might be labeled "opinion" under the First Amendment. The court reaffirmed that the dispositive question is whether a reasonable fact finder could conclude that the statement in issue conveyed the defamatory meaning, in that case that the petitioner perjured himself in a judicial proceeding. It found in the affirmative, noting that the language used was not loose, figurative, or hyperbolic, but rather factual in tone. ( Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., supra, 497 U.S. at pp. 18-19)In Milkovich v. Lorain Journal, a newspaper, the Lorain Journal, reported that a high school wrestling coach, Milkovich, had "lied" during a judicial proceeding which overturned a state athletic association's sanction imposed on his team. The Court rejected the newspaper's argument that its statements were constitutionally protected opinion. The Court began its analysis by explaining that early common law did not distinguish between factual statements and opinions in imposing liability for defamation, but due to concerns that unduly burdensome defamation laws could stifle valuable public debate, the privilege of "fair comment" was incorporated intothe common law as an affirmative defense to an action for defamation. "The principle of 'fair comment' afforded legal immunity for the honest expression of opinion on matters of legitimate public interest when based upon a true or privileged statement of fact." 497 U.S. at 13. After surveying the constitutional limitations on defamation liability in its own opinions, the Court concluded that it was unnecessary to create a separate privilege for "opinion" defined by some multi- factor test, as some courts had done. "We think the ''breathing space'' which ''freedoms of expression require in order to survive," the Court said, "is adequately secured by existing constitutional doctrine without the creation of an artificial dichotomy between 'opinion' and fact." Included in that doctrine, the Court explained, are the following principles: "A statement on matters of public concern must be provable as false before there can be liability under state defamation law, at least in situations, like the present, where a media defendant is involved" and "where public-official or public-figure plaintiffs are involved;" 497 U.S. at 19-20, 20 n.6. The Court rejected the proposition that the First Amendment protected all statements of opinion on issues of public concern. See Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 18-20. Instead, the Court held that falsity for constitutional purposes should be determined based on whether a statement carries a "provably false factual connotation." Id. at 18.