In Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005), the Court found evidence of intentional discrimination in "side-by-side comparisons of some black venire panelists who were struck and white panelists allowed to serve." 545 U.S. at 241. The Supreme Court granted federal habeas corpus relief to an African-American inmate in Texas, concluding that the state court's reasons supporting the absence of racial discrimination in the capital inmate's jury selection process were not supported by clear and convincing evidence. (Id. at p. 266.) The Miller-El court engaged in a comparative juror analysis which showed "that race was significant in determining who was challenged and who was not." (Id. at p. 252.) The Court noted that, "if a prosecutor's reason for striking a black panelist applies just as well to an otherwise-similar non-black who is permitted to serve, that is evidence tending to prove purposeful discrimination to be considered at Batson's third step." Id. In Miller-El, the Supreme Court relied not only on "remarkable" statistical disparities and "side-by-side comparisons" of jurors, 545 U.S. at 240-41, but also emphasized "broader patterns of practice," including "shuffling the venire panel" and "widely known evidence of the general policy of the Dallas County District Attorney's Office to exclude black venire members from juries at the time Miller-El's jury was selected." Id. at 253. The Court recognized that "at some points the significance of Miller-El's evidence was open to judgment calls, but when this evidence on the issues raised was viewed cumulatively its direction was too powerful to conclude anything but discrimination." Id. at 265, 125 S. Ct. at 2339. The Supreme Court explained: "If a prosecutor's proffered reason for striking a black panelist applies just as well to an otherwise-similar nonblack who is permitted to serve, that is evidence tending to prove purposeful discrimination to be considered at Batson's third step." (Id. at p. 241.) In further rejecting the prosecutor's reasons for striking a prospective African-American juror, the high court characterized as an afterthought the prosecutor's explanation-the prospective juror's brother's prior conviction-that he provided only after defense counsel had discredited an earlier-stated reason as patently false. (Id. at p. 246.) In addition to performing a comparative juror analysis, the high court considered broader patterns of discriminatory practice in the prosecutor's jury selection, including shuffling the jury cards to rearrange the order in which members of the panel were seated and questioned, disproportionately questioning prospective African-American jurors using a script describing a capital execution in graphic clinical detail to generate hesitation about capital punishment, and engaging in similar improper questioning. (Miller-El, supra, 545 U.S. at p. 255.) The Court also considered the Dallas County prosecutor's then-existing policy of systematically excluding African Americans from juries. (Id. at pp. 263-264.)