In Miller v. Florida (1987) 482 U.S. 423, Florida had established a sentencing scheme under which a "score" was calculated based upon the offense of which the defendant was convicted, the defendant's prior record and legal status at the time of the offense, and the injury inflicted on the victim. A "presumptive sentencing range" was prescribed for each score. If a trial court imposed a sentence within the presumptive range, the court was not required to provide reasons for its decision, and it could not be reviewed. A trial court could deviate from the presumptive range, but only if clear and convincing evidence warranted such a departure. A sentence outside the presumptive range required a trial court to provide a statement of reasons and was reviewable on appeal. (Miller, supra, 482 U.S. at pp. 425-426.) Miller involved a defendant who, at the time he committed his sex offenses, would have been subject to a presumptive range sentence between three and one-half years and four and one-half years. (Id. at p. 424.) At the time of his sentencing hearing, however, the law had been changed so that the presumptive range for an offender with his score had been increased to a term of between five and one-half years and seven years, and in accord with the sentencing scheme in effect at the time of sentencing, the trial court applied the guideline in effect at the time of sentencing and imposed a seven-year term. (Ibid.) The United States Supreme Court ruled that the trial court's application of the change in Florida's sentencing scheme violated the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws because no feature of the revised sentencing scheme could have been considered "ameliorative," and it was undisputed that the presumptive range of punishment had been increased for the purpose of punishing sex offenders more heavily. (Id. at pp. 431-434.)