In Minnesota v. Dickerson (1993) 508 U.S. 366, the defendant took what appeared to be evasive action after leaving a building known for cocaine traffic and after making eye contact with an officer in a nearby patrol vehicle. The officers stopped the defendant and patted him down for weapons. The officer conducting the pat-search did not discover any weapons but felt a small lump in the front pocket of the defendant's jacket. He " 'examined it with his fingers and it slid and it felt to be a lump of crack cocaine in cellophane.' " ( Id. at p. 369.) The officer reached into the pocket and retrieved a small bag of crack cocaine. (Ibid.) The police stopped the defendant as he was leaving a building known for cocaine traffic because he attempted to evade the police officers when he saw them. (Dickerson, supra, 508 U.S. at pp. 368-369.) A patdown search revealed no weapons, but the officer felt a "small lump" in the defendant's pocket. (Id. at p. 369.) The officer did not immediately suspect this lump was contraband but examined it further and, according to the state court's findings, "determined that the lump was contraband only after 'squeezing, sliding and otherwise manipulating the contents of the defendant's pocket'--a pocket which the officer already knew contained no weapon." (Id. at p. 378.) The United States Supreme Court expanded the permissible bounds of a Terry search to include the discovery of contraband which the officer inadvertently, but "immediately," detects through the sense of touch, i.e., the "plain feel" exception to the warrant requirement. Specifically, the court stated: If a police officer lawfully pats down a suspect's outer clothing and feels an object whose contour or mass makes its identity immediately apparent there has been no invasion of the suspect's privacy beyond that already authorized by the officer's search for weapons; if the object is contraband, its warrantless seizure would be justified by the same practical considerations that inhere in the plain view context. Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 375-76, 113 S. Ct. 2130. After it acknowledging the "plain feel" exception, the Dickerson Court concluded the seizure was constitutionally invalid because the officer did not immediately recognize a lump he felt in the suspect's pocket to be cocaine. Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 377-78, 113 S. Ct. 2130. The Supreme Court elaborated on the notion of privacy as the rationale behind the "plain view" doctrine: The rationale . . . is that if contraband is left in open view and is observed by a police officer from a lawful vantage point, there has been no invasion of a legitimate expectation of privacy and thus no 'search' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment -- or at least no search independent of the initial intrusion that gave the officers their vantage point. The warrantless seizure of contraband that presents itself in this manner is deemed justified by the realization that resort to a neutral magistrate under such circumstances would often be impracticable and would do little to promote the objectives of the Fourth Amendment.The Supreme Court recognized a plain feel exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 375, 124 L. Ed. 2d at 345. The Court reasoned that if "a police officer lawfully pats down a suspect's outer clothing and feels an object whose contour or mass makes its identity immediately apparent, there has been no invasion of the suspect's privacy beyond that already authorized by the officer's search for weapons; if the object is contraband, its warrantless seizure would be justified by the same practical considerations that inhere in the plain-view context." Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 375-76, 124 L. Ed. 2d at 346. The Court concluded that the search in Dickerson exceeded the scope of Terry because the incriminating character of the object felt was not immediately apparent to the officer. Id. at 379, 124 L. Ed. 2d at 348. The Court emphasized that "the officer determined that the lump was contraband only after 'squeezing, sliding and otherwise manipulating the contents of the defendant's pocket' -- a pocket which the officer already knew contained no weapon." Id. at 378, 124 L. Ed. 2d at 347 (quoting State v. Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d 840, 844 (Minn. 1992)). After feeling the lump in Dickerson's pocket, the officer reached into it and pulled out a bag of cocaine. The Court found the officer's manipulation of the object in Dickerson unlawful, stating the police officer "overstepped the bounds of the 'strictly circumscribed' search for weapons allowed under Terry. Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 26, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 908). Thus, if after feeling the object, the officer lacks probable cause to believe that the object is contraband without conducting some further search, the "immediately apparent" requirement has not been met and the plain feel doctrine cannot justify the seizure of that object. Id. at 375, 124 L. Ed. 2d at 345. The incriminating character of a lump in the accused's jacket packet was not immediately apparent to an officer who conducted a Terry "stop-and-frisk" to protect officer safety. ( Id. at pp. 377-378.) Only after " 'squeezing, sliding and otherwise manipulating the contents' " of the pocket that he already knew contained no weapon did the officer gain probable cause to believe that the lump was narcotic contraband. ( Id. at p. 378.) The United States Supreme Court found that the officer's own testimony " 'belies any notion that he "immediately" ' recognized the lump as crack cocaine" and held that the search and seizure was outside the scope of Terry authority for a warrantless search. ( Id. at p. 378.) The incriminating character of a small lump in a pocket of the defendant's jacket was not immediately apparent during a lawful patdown search. (Id. at p. 369.) That the lump was crack cocaine in cellophane became apparent only after the officer manipulated the lump with his fingers. (Ibid.) The court found that the officer's search exceeded the scope of the lawful patdown since it continued beyond what was necessary to determine whether the suspect was armed. (Id. at p. 379.) In Minnesota v. Dickerson, the defendant was involuntarily subjected to a Terry weapons patdown. No weapons were found, but the officer did feel a small lump in the defendant's jacket pocket. The officer determined the lump was cocaine only after manipulating it with his fingers. The United States Supreme Court concluded the cocaine should have been suppressed. "If a police officer lawfully pats down a suspect's outer clothing and feels an object whose contour or mass makes its identity immediately apparent, there has been no invasion of the suspect's privacy beyond that already authorized by the officer's initial search for weapons." (Minnesota, supra, 508 U.S. at p. 375.) This rationale is a species of the plain-view doctrine: contraband left open to the view or touch of an officer from a lawful vantage point involves no invasion of the possessor's legitimate expectation of privacy, and thus no search independent of any initial intrusion occurs. ( Id. at p. 375.) The United States Supreme Court considered "whether the Fourth Amendment permits the seizure of contraband detected through a police officer's sense of touch during a protective patdown search." ( Id. at p. 368.) The court determined that a police officer may seize contraband detected by touch during a protective patdown search "so long as the officers' search stays within the bounds marked by Terry." ( Id. at p. 373.) In Dickerson, the incriminating character of a small lump in a front pocket of the defendant's jacket was not immediately apparent to the officer during a lawful patdown. The fact that the lump was crack cocaine in cellophane became apparent only after the officer manipulated the lump with his fingers. ( Id. at p. 369.) The court found that the officer's search exceeded the scope of Terry since it continued beyond what was necessary to determine whether the suspect was armed. Therefore, the seizure of the cocaine was unconstitutional and the evidence had to be suppressed. ( Id. at pp. 377-379.) The United States Supreme Court established the "plain feel" doctrine, which holds that contraband discovered during a lawful Terry stop is admissible so long as the search does not exceed the bounds permitted by Terry. See 508 U.S. at 373. Thus, if the contour or mass of the object makes its identity immediately apparent, the officer may lawfully seize it. See id. at 375. Once an officer has determined that the object is not a weapon, however, and if its shape or size does not indicate its contraband nature, the search must stop. See 508 U.S. at 378. In Minnesota v. Dickerson, the United States Supreme Court announced what is known as the "plain-feel" doctrine, holding that police, conducting a lawful Terry-type search, may seize nonthreatening contraband when its incriminating nature is "immediately apparent" to the searching officer through his sense of touch. Id., 508 U.S. at 376. The court stated: "If a police officer lawfully pats down a suspect's outer clothing and feels an object whose contour or mass makes its identity immediately apparent, there has been no invasion of the suspect's privacy beyond that already authorized by the officer's search for weapons; if the object is contraband, its warrantless seizure would be justified by the same practical considerations that inhere in the plain-view context." Id. The United States Supreme Court held that police, conducting a lawful Terry-type search, may seize nonthreatening contraband when its incriminating nature is "immediately apparent" to the searching officer through his sense of touch. Id. at 376. The Court said: "If a police officer lawfully pats down a suspect's outer clothing and feels an object whose contour or mass makes its identity immediately apparent, there has been no invasion of the suspect's privacy beyond that already authorized by the officer's search for weapons; if the object is contraband, its warrantless seizure would be justified by the same practical considerations that inhere in the plain-view context." Id. The Supreme Court held that if a police officer detects contraband during a valid Terry patdown search, the officer may seize the contraband and it may be admitted into evidence. In stating the plain-feel doctrine, the Court rejected the contention that "plain feel" is not comparable to "plain view": "If a police officer lawfully pats down a suspect's outer clothing and feels an object whose contour or mass makes its identity immediately apparent, there has been no invasion of the suspect's privacy beyond that already authorized by the officer's search for weapons; if the object is contraband, its warrantless seizure would be justified by the same practical considerations that inhere in the plain-view context. "... The very premise of Terry, after all, is that officers will be able to detect the presence of weapons through the sense of touch and Terry upheld precisely such a seizure. Even if it were true that the sense of touch is generally less reliable than the sense of sight, that only suggests that officers will less often be able to justify seizures of unseen contraband. Regardless of whether the officer detects the contraband by sight or by touch, however, the Fourth Amendment's requirement that the officer have probable cause to believe that the item is contraband before seizing it ensures against excessively speculative seizures." (508 U.S. at 375-76.) The United States Supreme Court discussed what has come to be called the "plain feel" doctrine, stating that: Consistent with the Federal Constitution's Fourth Amendment, a police officer may seize nonthreatening contraband detected during a protective pat-down search of a person whom the officer has briefly stopped based on the officer's reasonable conclusion that criminal activity may be a foot with respect to such person, where the officer is justified in believing that the person is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others nearby, so long as the officer's search is strictly limited to that which is necessary for the discovery of weapons which might be used to harm the officer or others, because: (1) the "plain-view" doctrine - under which police officers may seize an object without a warrant if the officers are lawfully in a position from which they view the object, its incriminating character is immediately apparent, and the officers have a lawful right of access to the object - has an obvious application by analogy to cases in which an officer discovers contraband through the sense of touch during an otherwise lawful search; (2) if a police officer lawfully pats down a suspect's outer clothing and feels an object whose contour or mass makes its identity immediately apparent, there has been no invasion of the suspect's privacy beyond that already authorized by the officer's search for weapons, and the warrantless seizure of the object if it is contraband is justified by the realization that resort to a neutral magistrate under such circumstances would often be impractical and would do little to promote the objectives of the Fourth Amendment; (3) a suspect's privacy interests are not advanced by a categorical rule barring the warrantless seizure of contraband plainly detected through the sense of touch, since (a) the sense of touch is capable of revealing the nature of an object with sufficient reliability to support a seizure, (b) even if it were true that the sense of touch is generally less reliable than the sense of sight, such fact suggests only that officers will less often be able to justify seizures of unseen contraband, (c) the Fourth Amendment's requirement that officers have probable cause to believe that an item is contraband before seizing it insures against excessively speculative seizures, and (d) the seizure of an item whose identity is already known occasions no further invasion of privacy (Dickerson v. Minnesota, 508 U.S. at 366.)