In Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420 (1984), the United States Supreme Court addressed the privilege against self-incrimination in the context of probation. Marshall Murphy was prosecuted for criminal sexual conduct. He pleaded guilty to false imprisonment and received three years' probation. (Id. at p. 422.) The terms of Murphy's probation required him to participate in a treatment program for sexual offenders and to be truthful with the probation officer "in all matters." (Ibid.) In the course of his treatment, Murphy confessed to raping and murdering a teenage girl seven years earlier. (Id. at p. 423.) His treatment counselor gave this information to the probation officer, who then confronted Murphy with it. (Id. at pp. 423-424.) Murphy confessed to the probation officer as well, who in turn told the police. (Id. at p. 424.) At no point did Murphy invoke the Fifth Amendment. He was later indicted for first degree murder for killing the teenage girl. (Id. at p. 425.) The central issue in Murphy was whether Murphy's failure to invoke his Fifth Amendment rights allowed for the admission of his incriminating statements against him at trial. The high court concluded that Murphy had voluntarily chosen not to invoke his Fifth Amendment rights, notwithstanding the probation condition requiring him to answer questions. (Murphy, supra, 465 U.S. at pp. 433-434.) Marshall Murphy was prosecuted for criminal sexual conduct. He pleaded guilty to false imprisonment and received three years' probation. (Id. at p. 422.) The terms of Murphy's probation required him to participate in a treatment program for sexual offenders and to be truthful with the probation officer " 'in all matters.' " (Ibid.) His probation conditions "contained no suggestion that his probation was conditional on his waiving his Fifth Amendment privilege ... ." (Id. at p. 437.) In the course of his treatment, Murphy confessed to raping and murdering a teenage girl seven years earlier. (Id. at p. 423.) His treatment counselor gave this information to the probation officer, who confronted Murphy with it. (Id. at pp. 423-424.) Murphy confessed to the probation officer as well, who in turn told the police. (Id. at p. 424.) At no point did Murphy invoke the Fifth Amendment. He was later indicted for first degree murder for killing the teenage girl. (465 U.S. at p. 425.) Murphy, who was on probation for false imprisonment, admitted to his probation officer that he had committed an unrelated rape and murder. The issue before the U.S. Supreme Court was "whether the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the introduction into evidence of the admissions in Murphy's subsequent criminal prosecution." (Id. at p. 422.) The United States Supreme Court determined that a probationer's obligation under the terms of his probation to report to his probation officer and be truthful "did not in itself convert Murphy's otherwise voluntary statements into compelled ones." (Id. at pp. 422, 427.) The court held: "Since Murphy revealed incriminating information instead of timely asserting his Fifth Amendment privilege, his disclosures were not compelled incriminations. Because he had not been compelled to incriminate himself, Murphy could not successfully invoke the privilege to prevent the information he volunteered to his probation officer from being used against him in a criminal prosecution." (Id. at p. 440.)The central issue in Murphy was whether Murphy's failure to invoke his Fifth Amendment rights allowed the admission of his incriminating statements against him at trial. The high court concluded that Murphy had voluntarily chosen not to invoke his Fifth Amendment rights, notwithstanding the probation condition requiring him to answer questions. (Murphy, supra, 465 U.S. at pp. 433-434.) The court began its analysis by holding that the privilege against self-incrimination applies to probationers: "A defendant does not lose this protection against self-incrimination by reason of his conviction of a crime; notwithstanding that a defendant is imprisoned or on probation at the time he makes incriminating statements, if those statements are compelled they are inadmissible in a subsequent trial for a crime other than that for which he has been convicted." (Id. at p. 426.) The court then held that the probation condition requiring Murphy to answer questions truthfully did not, by itself, controvert this right; rather, his obligations were no different from those of any other witness in a proceeding: "The answers of such a witness to questions put to him are not compelled within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment unless the witness is required to answer over his valid claim of the privilege." (Id. at p. 427.) Thus, the court held that Murphy was subject to the general rule that the privilege against self-incrimination is not self-executing; rather, the privilege must be claimed by affirmatively invoking it. Because Murphy failed to do so, his statements were not "compelled" under the Fifth Amendment, and the use of his statements against him at trial did not violate the Fifth Amendment. (465 U.S. at p. 440.) The court began its analysis by holding that the privilege against self-incrimination applies to probationers: "A defendant does not lose this protection against self-incrimination by reason of his conviction of a crime; notwithstanding that a defendant is imprisoned or on probation at the time he makes incriminating statements, if those statements are compelled they are inadmissible in a subsequent trial for a crime other than that for which he has been convicted." (Id. at p. 426.) The court then held that the probation condition requiring Murphy to answer questions truthfully did not, by itself, controvert this right; rather, his obligations were no different from those of any other witness in a proceeding: "The answers of such a witness to questions put to him are not compelled within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment unless the witness is required to answer over his valid claim of the privilege." (Id. at p. 427.) Thus, the court held that Murphy was subject to the general rule that the privilege against self-incrimination is not self-executing; rather, the privilege must be claimed by affirmatively invoking it. The court then distinguished Murphy's circumstances from cases in which "the state not only compelled an individual to appear and testify, but also sought to induce him to forgo the Fifth Amendment privilege . . . ." (Murphy, supra, 465 U.S. at p. 434.) The court noted: "The threat of punishment for reliance on the privilege distinguishes cases of this sort from the ordinary case in which a witness is merely required to appear and give testimony." (Murphy, supra, 465 U.S. at p. 435.) The court then held that if the state had threatened to revoke Murphy's probation for invoking the Fifth Amendment, his statements would have been inadmissible at trial. (Ibid.) Thus, Murphy has long made clear that the state may not punish a probationer for invoking the Fifth Amendment. The Court considered the admissibility of self-incriminating statements made to a probation officer. Id. at 423. Murphy, the probationer, did not assert his right against self-incrimination and made statements during the interview that were later used against him in separate criminal proceedings. Id. at 423-25. The probation officer did not give Murphy Miranda warnings or otherwise inform him of his right against self-incrimination. Id. at 425. P10 First, the Court examined whether the probation officer was required to give Miranda warnings to Murphy. Id. at 429-30. The police must give an individual in custody Miranda warnings and the individual must knowingly and intelligently waive those rights in order for subsequent self-incriminating statements to be admissible in a separate criminal proceeding. Id. Miranda warnings are only required when an individual is in custody. Id. The Court found that the probation interview did not constitute police custody. Murphy, 465 U.S. at 430. The facts that attendance was mandatory and the defendant had to give truthful answers, that the probation officer deliberately elicited incriminating evidence, that Murphy did not expect the questions about prior criminal conduct, and that no observers were present did not change the Court's decision. Id. at 431-33. Therefore, the Court found that the probation officer's failure to give Miranda warnings did not make the incriminating statements inadmissible. Id. at 430. In Minnesota v. Murphy, Court held that the State cannot use involuntary or compelled statements against a criminal defendant. The general rule is that the defendant must affirmatively assert his or her right against self-incrimination or else the law will consider the defendant to have waived the right. Id. at 429. The United States Supreme Court has delineated some exceptions to the general rule, or instances when the right against self-incrimination is said to be "self-executing." Id. at 429-34. For example, when an individual is in police custody, the police must first give Miranda warnings and the individual must knowingly and intelligently waive those rights before self-incriminating statements will be admissible. Id. at 429-30. The Court held that the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination not only protects an individual against being involuntarily called as a witness against himself at a criminal trial in which he is a defendant, but also "'privileges him not to answer official questions put to him in any other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings . . . unless and until he is protected at least against the use of his compelled answers. . . .'" (Murphy, supra, at p. 426.) A person does not lose his Fifth Amendment rights simply because he has been convicted of a crime. Even where a person is imprisoned or on probation, if the state compels him to make incriminating statements that could be used in a prosecution against him for a crime other than for which he has been convicted, his Fifth Amendment rights have been violated. (Murphy, supra, 465 U.S. at p. 426.) Because the defendant in Murphy voluntarily told his probation officer about his crimes, he could not invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege to prevent the information from being used against him in a subsequent criminal prosecution. (Id. at p. 428-429.) The Court held: "A State may validly insist on answers to even incriminating questions and hence sensibly administer its probation system, as long as it recognizes that the required answers may not be used in a criminal proceeding and thus eliminates the threat of incrimination. Under such circumstances, a probationer's 'right to immunity as a result of his compelled testimony would not be at stake,' and nothing in the Federal Constitution would prevent a State from revoking probation for a refusal to answer that violated an express condition of probation or from using the probationer's silence as 'one of a number of factors to be considered by a finder of fact' in deciding whether other conditions of probation have been violated." (Murphy, supra, 465 U.S. at pp. 435-436, fn. 7.) As to a probationer's right to remain silent, Murphy holds only that a probationer may refuse to make "nonimmunized disclosures concerning his own criminal conduct." (Murphy, supra, 465 U.S. at p. 439.) In Murphy, the court held that "if the State, either expressly or by implication, asserts that invocation of the privilege would lead to revocation of probation, it would have created the classic penalty situation, the failure to assert the privilege would be excused, and the probationer's answers would be deemed compelled and inadmissible in a criminal prosecution." (Murphy, supra, 465 U.S. at p. 435.) The Supreme Court held that, under the penalty exception, "the failure to assert the privilege would be excused ... ." (Murphy, supra, 465 U.S. at p. 435.) This is simply an exception to the general rule that the Fifth Amendment must be affirmatively invoked; it does not render a compelled waiver constitutional. Under the penalty exception, Murphy's statements would have been inadmissible precisely because a threat to revoke his probation for asserting the privilege against self-incrimination would have violated the Fifth Amendment. The court in Murphy stated this explicitly in holding that "the State could not constitutionally carry out a threat to revoke probation for the legitimate exercise of the Fifth Amendment privilege." (Murphy, at p. 438.)