In Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 13 (1991), the Court rejected a similar position urged by an attorney who had sued a judge for authorizing police officers to use excessive force to bring the attorney to court. 502 U.S. at 10, 12. The court of appeals had ruled that the judge was not immune from suit because his directive to the officers was not a "judicial act." Id. at 12. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that a judge's direction to officers to bring a person to court is a "function normally performed by a judge" and therefore is a judicial act. Id. Although authorizing excessive force to compel court attendance is not a normal judicial function, the Court maintained that the nature of the act rather than the act itself was the linchpin for determining whether the judge had performed a judicial act. Id. Significantly, the Court reasoned as follows: But if only the particular act in question were to be scrutinized, then any mistake of a judge in excess of his authority would become a 'nonjudicial' act, because an improper or erroneous act cannot be said to be normally performed by a judge. If judicial immunity means anything, it means that a judge 'will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error . . . or was in excess of his authority.' Id. at 12-13. In Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11-12, the United States Supreme Court stated that absolute judicial immunity for judges is overcome in two circumstances. Specifically, the doctrine is inapplicable when a judge is sued for nonjudicial actions or if contested judicial actions were "taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction." Id.