Mitchell v. Helms

In Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 120 S. Ct. 2530, 147 L. Ed. 2d 660 (2000), the federal government gave money directly to state agencies -- local educational agencies ("LEAs") and state educational agencies ("SEAs") -- which then distributed money to schools. Id. at 801-02. The federal government required that the LEAs and SEAs distribute funds to both public and private schools, including religious schools, based on enrollment numbers. Id. at 802. The Court upheld the program because aid was "allocated on the basis of neutral, secular criteria . . . and was made available to both religious and secular beneficiaries on a nondiscriminatory basis." Id. at 795. In Mitchell v. Helms, some taxpayers challenged a school aid program, alleging it violated the Establishment Clause by providing aid to parochial schools. Under the program, the federal funds are distributed to state and local governmental agencies, which in turn lend educational materials and equipment to public and private schools, including parochial schools. (Mitchell, supra, 530 U.S. at pp. 801-803 120 S. Ct. at pp. 2537-2538, 147 L. Ed. 2d at pp. 670-672.) Several restrictions apply to aid provided to private schools, including that the "'services, materials, and equipment'" must be "'secular, neutral, and nonideological.'" (530 U.S. at p. 802 147 L. Ed. 2d at p. 671.) Mitchell held the program did not constitute government endorsement of religion in violation of the Establishment Clause. The court concluded that some direct, nonincidental government aid to religious schools is permissible if it is available neutrally to both secular and religious schools on a nondiscriminatory basis, if the aid is not itself unsuitable for use in public schools because of religious content, and if eligibility for aid is determined in a constitutionally permissible manner. (Mitchell, supra, 530 U.S. at pp. 147 L. Ed. 2d at pp. 675-686.) The plurality in Mitchell also stated the Establishment Clause does not require the exclusion of pervasively sectarian schools from otherwise permissible aid programs. (Mitchell, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 147 L. Ed. 2d at pp. 686-688.) At one time, whether school aid was unconstitutional depended upon whether the recipient school was "pervasively sectarian." (530 U.S. at p. 826 147 L. Ed. 2d at p. 686.) The plurality indicated this factor no longer should be used, stating "the inquiry into the recipient's religious views required by a focus on whether a school is pervasively sectarian is not only unnecessary but also offensive. It is well established, in numerous other contexts, that courts should refrain from trolling through a person's or institution's religious beliefs." (530 U.S. at p. 828 147 L. Ed. 2d at p. 687.) The plurality noted that "the religious nature of a recipient should not matter to the constitutional analysis, so long as the recipient adequately furthers the government's secular purpose." (Ibid.)