In Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37 (1996), the United States Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a Montana statute similar to section 22(b), which provided that voluntary intoxication "may not be taken into consideration in determining the existence of a mental state which is an element of the offense." (Mont. Code Ann., 45-2-203 (1995); Egelhoff, supra, 518 U.S. at pp. 39-40.) The defendant had been convicted of deliberate homicide, which required proof he "'purposely'" or "'knowingly'" caused the death of another, after the trial court precluded him from offering evidence he did not harbor either mental state due to extreme intoxication. (Egelhoff, supra, at pp. 40-41.) A total of four justices signed an opinion authored by Justice Scalia, which upheld the Montana statute as constitutional, using the following rationale: (1) the right to introduce relevant defense evidence is not absolute (id. at pp. 42-43); (2) a restriction on the right to introduce defense evidence violates the federal due process clause only when it "'"offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental"'" (id. at p. 43); (3) the right to have a jury consider evidence of voluntary intoxication is not a "fundamental principle of justice" for purposes of this rule (id. at pp. 43-48, 51-52, 56). In her concurring opinion, Justice Ginsburg concluded the Montana Legislature could bar consideration of voluntary intoxication on the issue of a defendant's state of mind without infringing the defendant's right to due process. (Egelhoff, supra, 518 U.S. at p. 56 (conc. opn. of Ginsburg, J.).) At the outset, Justice Ginsburg explained that a statute that "is simply a rule designed to keep out 'relevant, exculpatory evidence'" would violate due process, but a statute that is a "redefinition of the mental-state element of the offense" would not violate due process. (Id. at p. 57 (conc. opn. of Ginsburg, J.).) Justice Ginsburg concluded Montana's statute did not violate due process because it redefined the mental state element of the offense and thus "embodies a legislative judgment regarding the circumstances under which individuals may be held criminally responsible for their actions." (Id. at p. 57 (conc. opn. of Ginsburg, J.).) Justice Ginsburg explained: "Other state courts have upheld statutes similar to the Montana statute, not simply as evidentiary rules, but as legislative redefinitions of the mental-state element. See State v. Souza, 72 Haw. 246, 249 . . . (1991) ('legislature was entitled to redefine the mens rea element of crimes and to exclude evidence of voluntary intoxication to negate state of mind')." (Egelhoff, supra, 518 U.S. at p. 59 (conc. opn. of Ginsburg, J.).) In State v. Souza, the Hawaii Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of an amended statute that provided, "evidence of self-induced intoxication of the defendant is admissible to prove or negative conduct or to prove state of mind sufficient to establish an element of an offense. Evidence of self-induced intoxication of the defendant is not admissible to negative the state of mind sufficient to establish an element of the offense." (State v. Souza (1991) 72 Hawaii 246, 249.) By citing the statute in State v. Souza, Justice Ginsburg clarified her belief that by allowing evidence of voluntary intoxication to prove, but not disprove, the requisite mental state for a crime, a statute redefines the mental state element of the offense and does not violate due process. (Egelhoff, supra, 518 U.S. at p. 59 (conc. opn. of Ginsburg, J.).) In Montana v. Egelhoff, a plurality of the court upheld the constitutionality of a Montana statute providing voluntary intoxication "'may not be taken into consideration in determining the existence of a mental state which is an element of the offense.'" (Egelhoff, supra, 518 U.S. at p. 57.) The plurality found no due process violation because the right to have a jury consider intoxication evidence was not a "fundamental principle of justice." In concurrence, Justice Ginsberg drew a distinction between rules designed to keep out relevant, exculpatory evidence that might negate an essential element of a crime and violate due process, and rules that redefine the mental state element of the offense. (Ibid.) Justice Ginsburg viewed the Montana statute as a redefinition of the offense's required mental state and therefore excluding evidence of voluntary intoxication was constitutional. (Id. at pp. 57-59.) The Supreme Court considered and reversed a Montana Supreme Court decision that held: (1) that evidence of the defendant's voluntary intoxication was relevant to the issue of whether he acted knowingly and purposely in killing two men; (2) the Montana statute that prevented the jury from considering such evidence violated due process because it relieved the prosecution of part of its burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the crime charged. (Id. at p. 41.) Justice Scalia, in the plurality opinion, rejected the Montana state court ruling and held that the due process clause does not guarantee a defendant the right to present and have considered all relevant evidence. (Id. at pp. 42-43.) Using a historical analysis, the Supreme Court concluded that the right to introduce evidence of voluntary intoxication is not a fundamental principle of justice. (Id. at pp. 44-48.) The court stated: "It is not surprising that many States have held fast to or resurrected the common-law rule prohibiting consideration of voluntary intoxication in the determination of mens rea, because that rule has considerable justification -- which alone casts doubt upon the proposition that the opposite rule is a 'fundamental principle.'" (Id. at p. 49.) The court in Egelhoff thus concluded the Montana Legislature could exclude evidence of voluntary intoxication on the issue of defendant's state of mind. (Id. at p. 56.) Three justices joined the lead opinion, and Justice Ginsburg concurred in the judgment. Justice Ginsburg found the statute was a redefinition of the mental element of the offense and joined "the Court's judgment refusing to condemn the Montana statute as an unconstitutional enactment." (Egelhoff, supra, 518 U.S. at p. 57 (conc. opn. of Ginsburg, J.).) Justice Ginsburg further stated: "Defining mens rea to eliminate the exculpatory value of voluntary intoxication does not offend a 'fundamental principle of justice,' given the lengthy common-law tradition, and the adherence of a significant minority of the States to that position today. " (Id. at pp. 58-59 (conc. opn. of Ginsburg, J.).) The Supreme Court held that the affirmative defense of voluntary intoxication is not a fundamental principle of justice and may be abrogated without violating the federal Due Process Clause. The Court based its holding on the historical practice of English common law. "By the laws of England, . . . the intoxicated defendant 'shall have no privilege by this voluntary contracted madness, but shall have the same judgment as if he were in his right senses.'" Id. at 44 (quoting 1 Hale, Pleas of the Crown 32). Involuntary intoxication, in contrast, was a well-recognized affirmative defense at common law. See, e.g., City of Minneapolis v. Altimus, 306 Minn. 462, 238 N.W.2d 851, 855-56 (Minn. 1976) (quoting Hale, supra) ("That if a person by the unskilfulness of his physician, or by the contrivance of his enemies, eat or drink such a thing as causeth such a temporary or permanent phrenzy, as aconitum or nux vomica, this puts him into the same condition, in reference to crimes, as any other phrenzy, and equally excuseth him."). This differential treatment arises from the fundamental principle that one may be punished only for the results of one's voluntary acts or omissions. "'If a person that is drunk kills another, this shall be Felony, and he shall be hanged for it, and yet he did it through Ignorance, for when he was drunk he had no Understanding nor Memory; but inasmuch as that Ignorance was occasioned by his own Act and Folly, and he might have avoided it, he shall not be privileged thereby.'" Egelhoff, 518 U.S. at 45.