In Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc, 504 U.S. 374 (1992) the airline industry sought to enjoin state attorneys general from enforcing guidelines adopted by the National Association of Attorneys General, purporting to govern airline fare advertising. The opinion focused on the "relate to" language of the ADA's preemption clause. Reasoning from both the ordinary meaning and from case law interpreting similar language in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) preemption clause, the court found that "the words thus express a broad pre-emptive purpose" ( Morales, supra, 504 U.S. at p. 383), and that the proposed state enforcement actions "related to" fares and were preempted. Importantly, the court also found that Congress enacted the ADA's preemption clause "to ensure that the States would not undo federal deregulation with regulation of their own." ( Morales, supra, 504 U.S. at p. 378.) The United States Supreme Court considered whether subsection 41713(b)(1) preempted state attorneys general from enforcing state consumer protection laws regarding airline fares advertising. The Court considered "whether the A.D.A. pre-empts the States from prohibiting allegedly deceptive airline fare advertisements through enforcement of their general consumer protection statutes." Morales, 504 U.S. at 378. The United States Supreme Court held that the plain meaning of the term "relating to" in the preemption provision indicated a congressional intent to broaden the scope of preemption. Morales, supra, p 384. In other words, state statutes or actions having some "'connection with or reference to'" airline rates, routes, or services are preempted under the ADA. Id., quoting Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc, 463 U.S. 85, 97; 103 S. Ct. 2890; 77 L. Ed. 2d 490 (1983). The United States Supreme Court concluded that "the obligations imposed by the advertising guidelines would have a significant impact upon the airlines' ability to market their product, and hence a significant impact upon the fares they charge." Morales, supra, p 390. Thus, the fares advertising guidelines were preempted. Id. However, the United States Supreme Court cautioned against preempting claims where the state statute's effect on an airline's rates, routes, or services was "'tenuous, remote, or peripheral . . . .'" Morales, 504 U.S. at 390. The Court noted that preemption may be either express or implied and that the touchstone of its analysis is determining Congress's intent. Id. at 383. To determine that intent, the Court turned to an examination of the language of the preemption provision, focusing on the phrase "relating to." The Court defined the phrase as "having a connection with, or reference to, airline 'rates, routes, or services.'" Id. at 384. Thus, the Court held that, by using that phrase, Congress "expressed its broad pre-emptive purpose." Id. at 383. Rejecting the argument that "only state laws specifically addressed to the airline industry are pre-empted," id. at 386, the Court concluded that the general consumer-protection statutes were preempted because they purported to govern airline advertisements and, thus, related to airline rates. The Court noted that even "beyond the guidelines' express reference to fares, it is clear as an economic matter that state restrictions on fare advertising have a forbidden significant effect upon fares." Id. at 388. At the conclusion of its opinion, the Court included a significant caveat to its broad definition of "relates to." In response to the argument that it was stepping onto a slippery slope, the Court stated that "'some state actions may affect airline fares in too tenuous, remote, or peripheral a manner' to have pre-emptive effect.'" Id. at 390. As many courts have since noted, Morales concluded with the observation that "To adapt to this case our language in Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. (1983) 463 U.S. 85, 'some state actions may affect airline fares in too tenuous, remote, or peripheral a manner' to have pre-emptive effect. 463 U.S., at 100, n. 21." ( Morales, supra, 504 U.S. at p. 390 112 S. Ct. at p. 2040.)