Morton v. Mancari

Morton v. Mancari (1974) 417 U.S. 535, involved a Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) preference in employment which favored individuals who were "one-fourth or more degree Indian blood and . . . members of a Federally-recognized Indian tribe." (Id. at p. 553, fn. 24.) Non-Indians challenged an employment preference for Indians of one-quarter blood or more used by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) on the ground that it discriminated on the basis of race. (Id. at p. 539.) The court disagreed, grounding its decision on "the plenary power of Congress to deal with the special problems of Indians" and "the assumption of a 'guardian-ward' status." (Id. at pp. 551-552.) In Mancari, the Court found that although the preference had a racial component, it was "not even a 'racial' preference. Rather it is an employment criterion reasonably designed to further the cause of Indian self-government and to make the BIA more responsive to the needs of its constituent groups. It is directed to participation by the governed in the governing agency . . . similar in kind to the constitutional requirement that a United States Senator, when elected, be 'an Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen . . . . " (Mancari, 417 U.S. at pp. 553-554.) The opinion stated that the preference "is not directed towards a 'racial' group consisting of 'Indians'; instead, it applies only to members of 'federally recognized' tribes." This operates to exclude many individuals who are racially to be classified as 'Indians.'" (Id. at p. 553, fn. 24.) "In this sense," the Court said, "the preference is political rather than racial in nature." (Ibid.) The Court emphasized that "the preference applies only to employment in the Indian service. The preference does not cover any other Government agency or activity, and we need not consider here the obviously more difficult question that would be presented by a blanket exemption for Indians from all civil service examinations." (Id. at p. 554.) The Court applied the rational basis test to the hiring preference, finding that the preference could be "tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress' unique obligation toward the Indians," and that it was "reasonable and rationally designed to further Indian self-government. (Id. at p. 555.) The Court found that although the preference had a racial component, it was "not even a 'racial' preference." ( Id. at pp. 553-554 94 S. Ct. at p. 2484.) Instead, the court characterized the preference for members of a federally recognized tribe as "an employment criterion reasonably designed to further the cause of Indian self-government and to make the BIA more responsive to the needs of its constituent groups. It is directed to participation by the governed in the governing agency . . . similar in kind to the constitutional requirement that a United States Senator, when elected, be 'an Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen . .. .' " (Ibid.) Because the preference applies only to members of " 'federally recognized' " tribes, and thereby excludes many individuals who are racially classified as " 'Indians,' " the court said, "the preference is political rather than racial in nature." ( Id. at p. 553, fn. 24 94 S. Ct. at p. 2484.) The court was careful to emphasize that the employment preference did not pertain to any government agency or activity other than "employment in the Indian service," and chararacterized a preference extending to employment in other federal agencies as presenting an "obviously more difficult question" not reached by the opinion. ( Id. at p. 554 94 S. Ct. at p. 2484.) The Mancari court applied the rational basis test to the hiring preference, finding that the BIA employment preference for members of federally recognized tribes could be "tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress' unique obligation toward the Indians," and that it was "reasonable and rationally designed to further Indian self-government." ( Id. at p. 555 94 S. Ct. at p. 2485.) As the court noted, Congress has directed innumerable laws to Indians; and "if these laws, derived from historical relationships and explicitly designed to help only Indians, were deemed invidious racial discrimination, an entire Title of the United States Code (25 U.S.C.) would be effectively erased and the solemn commitment of the Government toward the Indians would be jeopardized." (Id. at p. 552.) Applying this broad mandate, legislation preferring Indians is constitutional when applying the rational basis test "as long as the special treatment can be tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress' unique obligation toward the Indians." (Id. at p. 555.) Justice Harry Blackmun, writing for the court, explained the court's view of the employment preference for Indians as a nonracial classification: "Contrary to the characterization made by appellees, this preference does not constitute 'racial discrimination.' Indeed, it is not even a 'racial' preference. Rather, it is an employment criterion reasonably designed to further the cause of Indian self-government and to make the BIA more responsive to the needs of its constituent groups." (Mancari, supra, 417 U.S. at pp. 553-554 94 S. Ct. at p. 2483.) The court's position was further explained in a related footnote: "The preference is not directed towards a 'racial' group consisting of 'Indians'; instead, it applies only to members of 'federally recognized' tribes. This operates to exclude many individuals who are racially to be classified as 'Indians.' In this sense, the preference is political rather than racial in nature. . . ." (Id. at p. 553, fn. 24.)