In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 282, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686, 84 S. Ct. 710 (1964), the Times had published a defamatory advertisement containing significant factual errors. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 256-59. The Times possessed the correct information in its own news files but failed to consult them. Id. at 287. This evidence, the Court held, "supported at most a finding of negligence in failing to discover the misstatements, and is constitutionally insufficient to show the recklessness that is required for a finding of actual malice." Id. at 288. This new "actual malice" standard was entirely distinct from common law malice, focusing on knowledge rather than motive. The New York Times Court believed the Constitution required the actual malice test in order to protect free debate and preserve political liberty. Quoting from Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1460, 78 S. Ct. 1332 (1958), the Court observed: A rule compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all his factual assertions -- and to do so on pain of libel judgments virtually unlimited in amount -- leads to a comparable "self-censorship." Allowance of the defense of truth, with the burden of proving it on the defendant, does not mean that only false speech will be deterred. . . . Under such a rule, would-be critics of official conduct may be deterred from voicing their criticism, even though it is believed to be true and even though it is in fact true, because of doubt whether it can be proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do so. They tend to make only statements which "steer far wider of the unlawful zone." The rule thus dampens the vigor and limits the variety of public debate.New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279. The Court rejected the notions that either the reputations of public officials or the desirability of accurate information were sufficiently important to justify traditional defamation standards. Thus, the Court observed: Where judicial officers are involved, this Court has held that concern for the dignity and reputation of the courts does not justify the punishment as criminal contempt of the judge or his decision. This is true even though the utterance contains "half-truths" and "misinformation." Such repression can be justified, if at all, only by a clear and present danger of the obstruction of justice . . . Judges are to be treated as men of fortitude, able to thrive in a hardy climate. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 272-73.