In New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982), the United States Supreme Court held that the compelling public interest in preventing the sexual exploitation and abuse of children justified the prohibition of child pornography because the use of children as subjects of pornographic photos, films or other recordings "is harmful to the physiological, emotional and mental health of the child." Id. at 758. Because such harm may occur regardless of whether the resulting work meets the Miller v. California obscenity test, a sexually explicit depiction of a child may be barred even if the work possesses legitimate literary, artistic, political or scientific value. Id. at 761. Nevertheless, because legislation banning child pornography, like that prohibiting obscenity, regulates speech, it must be carefully crafted to limit its reach. The conduct to be prohibited must be adequately defined, the prohibition must be limited to works that visually depict sexual conduct by children below a specified age, the forms of "sexual conduct" must be suitably limited and described, and criminal responsibility may not be imposed without some element of scienter on the part of the defendant. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764-65. The production and distribution of descriptions or other depictions of sexual conduct by children, if not obscene and if not involving live performance or photographic or other reproduction of live performance, retain First Amendment protection. Id. at 764-65. The United States Supreme explained the scope of the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine. "Like most exceptions to established principles, the doctrine must be carefully tied to the circumstances in which facial invalidation of a statute is truly warranted. Because of the wide-reaching effects of striking down a statute on its face at the request of one whose own conduct may be punished despite the First Amendment, we have recognized that the overbreadth doctrine is 'strong medicine' and have employed it with hesitation, and then 'only as a last resort.' The Court had, in consequence, insisted that the overbreadth involved be 'substantial' before the statute involved will be invalidated on its face.