In Norman v. B. & O.R. Co. (1935) 294 U.S. 240, the court rejected the obvious impairment of contract challenge to the legislation. It held that Congress has the power to regulate the monetary system, including the power to invalidate provisions of existing contracts which interfere with the exercise of that authority, and that the gold clauses constituted such an interference and were invalid. The court ruled that "contracts, however express, cannot fetter the constitutional authority of the Congress. Contracts may create rights of property, but when contracts deal with a subject matter which lies within the control of the Congress, they have a congenital infirmity. Parties cannot remove their transactions from the reach of dominant constitutional power by making contracts about them." (Norman v. B. & O.R. Co., supra, 294 U.S. at pp. 307-308 55 S. Ct. at p. 416.) The court concluded: "There is no constitutional ground for denying to the Congress the power expressly to prohibit and invalidate contracts although previously made, and valid when made, when they interfere with the carrying out of the policy it is free to adopt." (Id. at pp. 309-310.) The Supreme Court refused to second-guess the congressional determination that the gold clauses had to be invalidated as a part of the federal response to the monetary crisis which arose during the Great Depression: "We may inquire whether Congress's action is arbitrary or capricious, that is, whether it has reasonable relation to a legitimate end. If it is an appropriate means to such an end, the decisions of the Congress as to the degree of the necessity for the adoption of that means, is final." (Norman v. B. & O.R. Co., supra, 294 U.S. at p. 311 55 S. Ct. at p. 417.)