In Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493 (1984), the defendant pled guilty at his arraignment to two lesser-included offenses and not guilty to two greater offenses. The defendant was indicted for four offenses arising from the same incident and pleaded guilty to two of the offenses--involuntary manslaughter and grand theft. (Ohio v. Johnson, supra, 467 U.S. at p. 494.) The Supreme Court rejected the defendant's claim that a determination of guilt and punishment on one count of a multicount indictment immediately raises a double jeopardy bar to continued prosecution on any remaining counts that are greater or lesser included offenses of that charge. Thereafter, the trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the other two more serious charges--murder and aggravated robbery--"on the ground that because of his guilty pleas, further prosecution on the more serious offenses was barred by the double jeopardy prohibitions of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments." (Ibid.) The United States Supreme Court disagreed, concluding that "prosecuting the defendant on the two more serious charges would not constitute the type of 'multiple prosecution' prohibited by the Double Jeopardy Clause." (Ibid.) The trial court then granted his motion to dismiss the two greater charges as barred by double jeopardy, a decision affirmed on appeal by the Ohio Supreme Court. Id. The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that "prosecuting defendant on the two more serious charges would not constitute the type of 'multiple prosecution' prohibited by the Double Jeopardy Clause." Id. The Supreme Court explained that continuing prosecution on the unresolved charges did not violate double jeopardy principles because "there simply has been none of the governmental overreaching that double jeopardy is supposed to prevent. On the other hand, ending prosecution now would deny the State its right to one full and fair opportunity to convict those who have violated its laws." Id. at 501. The Court explained the double jeopardy protections as follows: "It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal. It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction. And it protects against multiple punishments for the same offense. While the Double Jeopardy Clause may protect a defendant against cumulative punishments for convictions on the same offense, the Clause does not prohibit the State from prosecuting respondent for such multiple offenses in a single prosecution. Respondent's argument is that a determination of guilt and punishment on one count of a multicount indictment immediately raises a double jeopardy bar to continued prosecution on any remaining counts that are greater or lesser included offenses of the charge just concluded. We have never held that, and decline to hold it now." Moreover, each count of a multi-count indictment is deemed distinct and independent of all other counts, and thus inconsistent verdicts on different counts do not justify overturning a guilty verdict. See State v. Hicks (1989), 43 Ohio St.3d 72, 78, 538 N.E.2d 1030; State v. Brown (1984), 12 Ohio St.3d 147, 12 Ohio B. 186, 465 N.E.2d 889, paragraph one of the syllabus; State v. Washington (1998), 126 Ohio App.3d 264, 276, 710 N.E.2d 307. "The sanctity of the jury verdict should be preserved and could not be upset by speculation or inquiry into such matters to resolve the inconsistency." State v. Lovejoy, 79 Ohio St.3d 440, 444, 1997 Ohio 371, 683 N.E.2d 1112. The Ohio v. Johnson court explained that "no interest of the defendant protected by the Double Jeopardy Clause is implicated by continuing prosecution on the remaining charges brought in the indictment. Here the defendant offered only to resolve part of the charges against him, while the State objected to disposing of any of the counts against defendant without a trial. The defendant has not been exposed to conviction on the charges to which he pleaded not guilty, nor has the State had the opportunity to marshal its evidence and resources more than once or to hone its presentation of its case through a trial. The acceptance of a guilty plea to lesser included offenses while charges on the greater offenses remain pending, moreover, has none of the implications of an 'implied acquittal' which results from a verdict convicting a defendant on lesser included offenses rendered by a jury charged to consider both greater and lesser included offenses. . There simply has been none of the governmental overreaching that double jeopardy is supposed to prevent. On the other hand, ending prosecution now would deny the State its right to one full and fair opportunity to convict those who have violated its laws. ." (Id. at pp. 501-502.)