In Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997), the defendant was charged with the prohibited possession of a firearm by virtue of his status as a convicted felon. Although the defendant offered to stipulate to the fact of a prior conviction, the trial court allowed the government to decline the stipulation and prove the prior conviction was for assault causing serious bodily injury. Id. at 175-77. In reversing, the Supreme Court found the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the government to prove the nature of the prior offense. It observed: In this case, as in any other in which the prior conviction is for an offense likely to support conviction on some improper ground, the only reasonable conclusion was that the risk of unfair prejudice did substantially outweigh the discounted probative value of the record of conviction, and it was an abuse of discretion to admit the record when an admission was available. 519 U.S. at 191. The defendant was prosecuted for the offense of possession of a firearm by a felon. Id. Because any type of felony conviction was sufficient to prosecute the defendant for possession of a firearm, the Court decided that allowing the Government to prove the particular felony of which the defendant was previously convicted was of little probative value; yet it could substantially prejudice the defendant by allowing the jury to improperly focus on the previous crime rather than the instant offense. Id. The Supreme Court held that such a result violated Federal Rule of Evidence 403 and thus precluded the Government from proving what felony the defendant was previously convicted of if he chose to stipulate that he was indeed a felon. Id. Federal Rule of Evidence 403 is materially identical to Texas Rule of Evidence 403. In Old Chief, the Supreme Court determined that: Given the peculiarities of the element of felony-convict status and of admissions and the like when used to prove it, there is no cognizable difference between the evidentiary significance of an admission and of the legitimately probative component of the official record the prosecution would prefer to place in evidence. For purposes of the Rule 403 weighing of the probative against the prejudicial, the functions of the competing evidence are distinguishable only by the risk inherent in the one and wholly absent in the other. In this case, as in any other in which the prior conviction is for an offense likely to support conviction on some improper ground, the only reasonable conclusion was that the risk of unfair prejudice did substantially outweigh the discounted probative value of the record of conviction, and it was abuse of discretion to admit the record when an admission was available. Id. The defendant was convicted under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) of possession of a firearm by a felon. 519 U.S. at 174. The offense prohibited the possession of a firearm by anyone with a prior felony conviction. Id. The statute did not require proof of the name of the particular felony committed. Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 186. At trial, the defendant offered to stipulate that he had been previously convicted of a felony and that this felony qualified to meet the "prior felony" element of the crime. Id. The prosecution refused the offer, and the trial court admitted into evidence (over objection) the judgment of conviction for the prior felony. Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 177. That judgment disclosed that the defendant had committed an "assault resulting in serious bodily injury." Id. The Supreme Court held that the judgment's disclosure of the specific felony offense constituted unfair prejudice which substantially outweighed the probative value of the evidence, given the defendant's willingness to stipulate to having a prior felony conviction. Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 190-191. Crucial to this holding was the finding that the statute was not concerned with the kind of felony offense but only with whether a prior felony had been committed. Id. In sum, the defendant was prosecuted for the crime of possession of a weapon having been previously convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment in excess of one year. The statute did not require that any particular crime be committed. The defendant offered to "solve the problem here by stipulating, agreeing and requesting the Court to instruct the jury that he has been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment exceeding one (1) year" (175). The prosecution refused to accept the proposed stipulation and argued that it had the right to prove the case in any fashion that was legal. The trial court refused the unilateral offer to stipulate and admitted the evidence as to the name of the crime. The United States Supreme Court reversed the conviction stating that the prejudicial effect of informing the jury of the name of the defendant's prior crime outweighed the probative value of the evidence. The Court held that notwithstanding the prosecution's right to present evidence of its choice, where the defendant's status as a person with a previous conviction is the element which enhances the crime, the trial court should accept the defendant's offer to stipulate even over the prosecution's objection. The Old Chief majority in a lengthy discussion identified two reasons for the "general rule" that the prosecution is entitled to prove its case by evidence of its choice and not by stipulation (187-189). The first reason is that live evidence, as opposed to stipulations, is more vivid in the minds of a juror and paints a clearer picture of what happened at the time of the crime. The second reason is to fulfill a juror's expectations of evidence of the crime. Nonetheless, in Old Chief the Court found the rational inapplicable to the issue of the element of the defendant's status as a person convicted of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment of more than one year.