Oregon v. Bradshaw

In Oregon v. Bradshaw (1983) 462 U.S. 1039, the defendant requested an attorney during interrogation, and the officer stopped questioning him. (Bradshaw, supra, 462 U.S. at pp. 1041-1042.) Sometime later, the defendant asked an officer, "'Well, what is going to happen to me now?'" The officer responded that the defendant, having requested an attorney, did not have to speak to him. The defendant said he understood, and his subsequent actions resulted in statements later used against him. (Id. at p. 1042.) The Supreme Court, finding that the defendant had chosen to initiate further discussions about the case with the authorities, did not have his rights under Miranda violated. (Id. at pp. 1044-1046.) "Although ambiguous, the respondent's question in this case as to what was going to happen to him evinced a willingness and a desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation; it was not merely a necessary inquiry arising out of the incidents of the custodial relationship. It could reasonably have been interpreted by the officer as relating generally to the investigation." (Id. at pp. 1045-1046.) The Court concluded that defendant's question, "'Well, what is going to happen to me now?'" showed that he initiated conversation with police about a traffic fatality investigation after having previously asserted his right to counsel. (Id. at pp. 1045-1046.) As to whether police obtained a valid waiver of defendant's rights to silence and an attorney after defendant initiated further conversation, the court noted that the question turned on the standard inquiry into whether the waiver was knowing and intelligent and found to be so under the totality of the circumstances, a determination that "depends upon '"the particular facts and circumstances surrounding [the] case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused."'" (Id. at p. 1046) The United States Supreme Court held that the defendant, who had previously invoked his right to counsel, initiated further conversation with the police by asking, "'Well, what is going to happen to me now?'" The Court wrote: While we doubt that it would be desirable to build a superstructure of legal refinements around the word "initiate" in this context, there are undoubtedly situations where a bare inquiry by either a defendant or by a police officer should not be held to "initiate" any conversation or dialogue. There are some inquiries, such as a request for a drink of water or a request to use a telephone that are so routine that they cannot be fairly said to represent a desire on the part of an accused to open up a more generalized discussion relating directly or indirectly to the investigation. Such inquiries or statements, by either an accused or police officer, relating to routine incidents of the custodial relationship, will not generally "initiate" a conversation in the sense in which that word was used in Edwards. Id. The Court, however, held that the defendant's question "evinced a willingness and a desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation; it was not merely a necessary inquiry arising out of the incidents of the custodial relationship." 462 U.S. at 1045-46. The Supreme Court stated that the admissibility of a confession given by a defendant who earlier invoked his Miranda right to counsel is to be determined by a two-step analysis. First, it must be asked whether the defendant "initiated" further conversation. If it is found the defendant "initiated" further conversation, it must then be inquired whether the defendant waived his right to counsel, that is whether the purported waiver is knowing and intelligent under the totality of the circumstances, including the necessary fact that the accused, not the police, reopened the dialog with the authorities. Id.