In Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160 (2009), the defendant was convicted of multiple crimes. 555 U.S. at 165. Oregon law gave the trial judge discretion to impose consecutive sentences upon making certain judicial findings. Id. at 165-66. The trial judge made such findings and imposed consecutive sentences. Id. In upholding the consecutive sentences, the Court noted that "the historical record demonstrates that the jury played no role in the decision to impose sentences consecutively or concurrently. Rather, the choice rested exclusively with the judge." Id. at 168. Thus, the Court held that "there is no encroachment here by the judge upon facts historically found by the jury, nor any threat to the jury's domain as a bulwark at trial between the State and the accused." Id. at 169. Accordingly, the Court held that the Oregon statute, which "assigns to judges a decision that has not traditionally belonged to the jury," does not violate the Apprendi rule. Id. at 172. The United States Supreme Court addressed the application of Apprendi v. New Jersey and its progeny -- decisions "rooted in the historic jury function of determining whether the prosecution has proved each element of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt" -- to "a sentencing function in which the jury traditionally played no part: When a defendant has been tried and convicted of multiple offenses, each involving discrete sentencing prescriptions, does the Sixth Amendment mandate jury determination of any fact declared necessary to the imposition of consecutive, in lieu of concurrent, sentences?" (Ice, supra, 129 S.Ct. at p. 714.) The court observed that most states follow the common-law tradition of entrusting the question of concurrent versus consecutive sentences to judges' unfettered discretion, while in others, sentences for multiple offenses are presumed to run consecutively, although sentencing judges may order concurrent terms upon finding cause therefor. Neither scheme runs afoul of the Sixth Amendment. (Ibid.) In Oregon and still other states, however, judges' discretion is constrained in that they are required to find certain facts before imposing consecutive, rather than concurrent, sentences. The Supreme Court held, "in light of historical practice and the authority of States over administration of their criminal justice systems, that the Sixth Amendment does not exclude Oregon's choice." (Id. at pp. 714-715.) In reaching this conclusion, the high court rejected Ice's argument that he was entitled to concurrent sentences absent the factual findings required by Oregon law: "The scope of the constitutional jury right must be informed by the historical role of the jury at common law. It is therefore not the case that ... the federal constitutional right attaches to every contemporary state-law 'entitlement' to predicate findings." (Ice, supra, 129 S.Ct. at p. 718.) The court went on to state: "It bears emphasis that state legislative innovations like Oregon's seek to rein in the discretion judges possessed at common law to impose consecutive sentences at will. Limiting judicial discretion to impose consecutive sentences serves the 'salutary objectives' of promoting sentences proportionate to 'the gravity of the offense,' and of reducing disparities in sentence length. All agree that a scheme making consecutive sentences the rule, and concurrent sentences the exception, encounters no Sixth Amendment shoal. To hem in States by holding that they may not equally choose to make concurrent sentences the rule, and consecutive sentences the exception, would make scant sense. Neither Apprendi nor our Sixth Amendment traditions compel straitjacketing the States in that manner." (Ice, supra, at p. 719.)