In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985), the substantive due process issue of conflict of law came in a direct appeal of the judgment and not as a collateral attack on the judgment when full faith and credit were sought to be applied for res judicata purposes. Plaintiffs' conflict of law/due process attack exists to permit a collateral attack on the California judgment and to allow a new class action to proceed in Georgia. Since the case settled in California with the trial court's approval and was not tried, then the trial court under its procedural law did not have to finally determine which state's substantive law to apply, including other states' conflict of law rules, but did appropriately use California procedural law. Therefore, no conflict of law/due process violation occurred, as in Shutts, supra, because procedural law in a class action under conflict of law follows the law of the forum. See Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717 (1988). However, in the approval order, the California trial court had to make a preliminary evaluation of the case on its merits, which it did by looking to the substantive law from other states. The U.S. Supreme Court identified two factors that a court must consider in determining whether inclusion of non-resident class members comports with due process: (1) Is the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the claims of non-resident class members constitutional? (2) Is the application of forum law to the claims of non-resident class members constitutional? (Id. at pp. 811-813, 822-823.) In Phillips, the Court held that a forum state may constitutionally exercise personal jurisdiction over the claims of non-resident class members so long as "minimal procedural due process protection" exists, i.e., the non-resident class members have adequate representation by the named plaintiffs, adequate notice, the opportunity to be heard, and the opportunity to opt out of the class. (Phillips, supra, 472 U.S. at pp. 811-813.) The Court also held that a forum state may constitutionally apply its substantive law to the claims of non-resident class members only if the forum state has "'significant contact or aggregation of contacts' to the claims asserted by each member of the plaintiff class, contacts 'creating state interests,' in order to ensure that the choice of forum is not arbitrary or unfair." (Id. at pp. 822-823.) Since approval of a class action settlement does not require a final decision on the substantive law merits, including applicable conflict of law rules, and does not require the trial court to expressly consider the law of every state involved, then there existed no conflict of law/substantive due process clause violation when the trial court made no final decision as to the applicable substantive law of other states. See Class Plaintiffs v. City of Seattle, 955 F.2d 1268, 1291 (9th Cir. 1992); See also Dunk v. Ford Motor Co., 48 Cal. App. 4th 1794, 1806-1807, n. 18 (1996). See generally Alicke v. MCI Communications Corp., 324 U.S. App. D.C. 150, 111 F.3d 909, 912 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (describing the prevailing industry practice of rounding up the billing minutes and finding that reasonable customers should have expected this). In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, the Supreme Court also held that a state must have "'significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts' to the claims asserted by each member of the plaintiff class, contacts 'creating state interests,' in order to ensure that the choice of a state's law is not arbitrary or unfair." Id. at 821-22. The Court gave "little credence" to the proposition that plaintiffs "by failing to opt out, evinced their desire to be bound by a state's law." Id. at 820. However, even under Phillips Petroleum's choice of law requirements an "important element" of determining fairness is "the expectation of the parties." 472 U.S. at 822.