Planned Parenthood v. Casey

A woman's right to choose abortion that the United States Supreme Court has recognized is not absolute. The Supreme Court explained in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 869, 120 L. Ed. 2d 674, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992): At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. . . . These considerations begin our analysis of the woman's interest in terminating her pregnancy but cannot end it, for this reason: though the abortion decision may originate within the zone of conscience and belief, it is more than a philosophic exercise. Abortion is a unique act. It is an act fraught with consequences for others: for the woman who must live with the implications of her decision; for the persons who perform and assist in the procedure; for the spouse, family, and society which must confront the knowledge that these procedures exist, procedures some deem nothing short of an act of violence against innocent human life; and, depending on one's beliefs, for the life or potential life that is aborted. Casey, 505 U.S. at 851-852. When the woman is a minor, her right is subject to two important limitations: the State's interest in protecting the welfare of all its citizens and the life of the unborn, and the interest of parents and families in living their lives free from undue state interference. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 444, 111 L. Ed. 2d 344, 110 S. Ct. 2926 (1990) In Casey, the Supreme Court explained: Though the woman has a right to choose to terminate or continue her pregnancy before viability, it does not at all follow that the State is prohibited from taking steps to ensure that this choice is thoughtful and informed. Even in the earliest stages of pregnancy, the State may enact rules and regulations designed to encourage her to know that there are philosophic and social arguments of great weight that can be brought to bear in favor of continuing the pregnancy to full term and that there are procedures and institutions to allow adoption of unwanted children as well as a certain degree of state assistance if the mother chooses to raise the child herself. "'The Constitution does not forbid a State or city, pursuant to democratic processes, from expressing a preference for normal childbirth.'" It follows that States are free to enact laws to provide a reasonable framework for a woman to make a decision that has such profound and lasting meaning. What is at stake is the woman's right to make the ultimate decision, not a right to be insulated from all others in doing so. Regulations which do no more than create a structural mechanism by which the State, or the parent or guardian of a minor, may express profound respect for the life of the unborn are permitted, if they are not a substantial obstacle to the woman's exercise of the right to choose. It cannot be questioned that psychological well-being is a facet of health. Nor can it be doubted that most women considering an abortion would deem the impact on the fetus relevant, if not dispositive, to the decision. In attempting to ensure that a woman apprehend the full consequences of her decision, the State furthers the legitimate purpose of reducing the risk that a woman may elect an abortion, only to discover later, with devastating psychological consequences, that her decision was not fully informed. If the information the State requires to be made available to the woman is truthful and not misleading, the requirement may be permissible. We permit a State to further its legitimate goal of protecting the life of the unborn by enacting legislation aimed at ensuring a decision that is mature and informed, even when in so doing the State expresses a preference for childbirth over abortion. In short, requiring that the woman be informed of the availability of information relating to fetal development and the assistance available should she decide to carry the pregnancy to full term is a reasonable measure to ensure an informed choice, one which might cause the woman to choose childbirth over abortion. Casey, 505 U.S. at 872-883. To sum up, the Supreme Court stated: "the woman's liberty to choose abortion is not so unlimited . . . that from the outset the State cannot show its concern for the life of the unborn . . . ." Casey, 505 U.S. at 869. "Only where state regulation imposes an undue burden on a woman's ability to make this decision does the power of the State reach into the heart of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause." Casey, 505 U.S. at 874. In Casey, the Chief Justice, joined by three other Justices, agreed with the plurality that the informed consent provisions at issue did not unduly burden the abortion decision. See id. at 969 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). In the Chief Justice's separate opinion, the concurring Justices observed that a state "has an interest in preserving unborn life," and that it may take steps to ensure "that a woman's decision to abort is a well-considered one, and reasonably furthers the State's legitimate interest in maternal health and in the unborn life of the fetus." Id. The Chief Justice's opinion further concluded that a 24-hour waiting period designed to give a woman time to reflect on her decision "'is surely a small cost to impose to ensure that the woman's decision is well considered in light of its certain and irreparable consequences on fetal life, and the possible effects on her own.'" Casey, 505 U.S. at 969-70 (quoting Akron I, 462 U.S. at 474 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)).