In Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765 (1995), the Supreme Court explained that the issue in step two is the facial validity of the prosecutor's explanation, and "unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor's explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral." Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768. Thus, it is only at step three "that the persuasiveness of the justification becomes relevant--the step in which the trial court determines whether the opponent of the strike has carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination." Id. The Court held: "At that stage, implausible or fantastic justifications may (and probably will) be found to be pretexts for purposeful discrimination. But to say that a trial judge may choose to disbelieve a silly or superstitious reason at step three is quite different from saying that a trial judge must terminate the inquiry at step two when the race-neutral reason is silly or superstitious. The latter violates the principle that the ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike." Id. In Purkett v. Elem, the prosecutor in State court peremptorily challenged two prospective black male jurors, because one had " 'long curly hair' " and another had a " 'mustache and goatee type beard,' " and the defense attorney's Batson claim was rejected in State court. Ultimately, the United States Supreme Court remitted the matter for further proceedings, with the following observations: "The Court of Appeals erred by combining Batson's second and third steps into one, requiring that the justification tendered at the second step be not just neutral but also at least minimally persuasive ... It is not until the third step that the persuasiveness of the justification becomes relevant ... At that stage, implausible or fantastic justifications may (and probably will) be found to be pretexts for purposeful discrimination. But to say that a trial judge may choose to disbelieve a silly or superstitious reason at step three is quite different from saying that a trial judge must terminate the inquiry at step two" (supra, at 768). The United States Supreme Court refined the test for determining whether a juror has been struck for a reason violative of Batson. First, the opponent of the strike must make a prima fade showing of discrimination on the basis of race, gender, or some other protected characteristic. Id. at 767. Next, the proponent of the strike must offer a neutral basis for the strike. Purkett, 514 U.S. at 767. The basis must be more than a mere denial of improper motive, but it need not be "persuasive, or even plausible." Id. at 768. After a neutral basis has been offered, the opponent of the strike must persuade the trial court that the proponent's reason is pretextual and that the strike is actually based on race, gender, or another protected characteristic. Id.