Quilloin v. Walcott

In Quilloin v. Walcott (1978) 434 U.S. 246, the father of an illegitimate child complained of a distinction in Georgia law under which, if a child was born during marriage, the consent of both the mother and father was required for a subsequent adoption, whereas if the child was born out of wedlock, only the mother's consent was required for a subsequent adoption. The appellant in that case asserted that his interests were indistinguishable from those of a married father who had separated or divorced from the mother. The court rejected this argument, stating: "We think appellant's interests are readily distinguishable from those of a separated or divorced father, and accordingly believe that the State could permissibly give appellant less veto authority than it provides to a married father. para. . . . Appellant never exercised actual or legal custody over his child, and thus has never shouldered any significant responsibility with respect to the daily supervision, education, protection, or care of the child . . . . In contrast, legal custody of children is, of course, a central aspect of the marital relationship, and even a father whose marriage has broken apart will have borne full responsibility for the rearing of his children during the period of the marriage. Under any standard of review, the State was not foreclosed from recognizing this difference in the extent of commitment to the welfare of the child." ( Id., at p. 256.) In Quilloin v. Walcott, despite the existence of a blood relationship, the court did not find a constitutionally protected parent-child relationship. Procedurally, the case is very similar to the case before this Court. A child was born out of wedlock. The mother subsequently marries another man who thereby becomes the child's stepfather. Eventually, the mother consented to the stepfather's adoption of the child. The natural father, who will be displaced by the adoption, objects. In Georgia, the natural father has veto authority over the adoption of his child unless he is adjudicated to be an unfit father. But, if the natural father has not married the mother and acknowledged the child as his own or obtained a court order legitimating the child, he would have no right to be heard in the adoption proceeding. The court's determination would be based on the "best interests of the child" under the statute. The Quilloin court concluded that the Georgia statute did not violate the father's due process rights.