Richardson v. United States

In Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317 (1984) the defendant was indicted on two counts of distributing a controlled substance and one count of conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance. The jury acquitted the defendant of one count but was unable to reach a verdict as to the two remaining counts. The trial court declared a mistrial as to the two remaining counts and scheduled a retrial. The trial court further denied the defendant's motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds. On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the defendant, relying on Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978), asserted that if the government failed to introduce sufficient evidence to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at the first trial, then he could not be retried again following a declaration of a mistrial because of a hung jury. The Supreme Court rejected this argument. The court, in discussing the long line of cases holding that a retrial following a "hung jury" does not violate double jeopardy concerns, stated: We are entirely unwilling to uproot this settled line of cases by extending the reasoning of Burks, which arose out of an appellate finding of insufficiency of evidence to convict following a jury verdict of guilty, to a situation where the jury is unable to agree on a verdict. We think that the principles governing our decision in Burks, and the principles governing our decisions in the hung jury cases, are readily reconciled when we recognize that the protection of the Double Jeopardy Clause by its terms applies only if there has been some event, such as an acquittal, which terminates the original jeopardy. Richardson, 468 U.S. at 324-25.In Richardson, the court stated: The protection of the Double Jeopardy Clause by its terms applies only if there has been some event, such as an acquittal, which terminates the original jeopardy. Since jeopardy attached here when the jury was sworn, petitioner's argument necessarily assumes that the judicial declaration of a mistrial was an event which terminated jeopardy in his case and which allowed him to assert a valid claim of double jeopardy. We reaffirm the proposition that a trial court's declaration of a mistrial following a hung jury is not an event that terminates the original jeopardy to which petitioner was subjected. The Government, like the defendant, is entitled to resolution of the case by verdict from the jury, and jeopardy does not terminate when the jury is discharged because it is unable to agree. Regardless of the sufficiency of the evidence at petitioner's first trial, he has no valid double jeopardy claim to prevent his retrial. Id. at 325-26.