Roper v. Simmons

In Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551, the United States Supreme Court held the imposition of capital punishment on juvenile offenders for any offense whatsoever violated the Eighth Amendment. (543 U.S. at pp. 578-579.) The court explained that because juveniles have lessened culpability they are less deserving of the most severe punishments. (Id. at p. 569.) The court noted that, as compared to adults, juveniles have a " 'lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility' "; they "are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure"; and their characters are "not as well formed." (Id. at pp. 569-570.) The Court held the Eighth Amendment prohibited imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed when the offender was under 18. In doing so, the high court overruled its prior decision in Stanford v. Kentucky (1989) 492 U.S. 361, which had held that the Eighth Amendment did not ban the execution of juvenile offenders older than 15 years but under 18 years. (Roper, supra, 543 U.S. at p. 562.) Recognizing that "the death penalty is the most severe punishment" (id. at p. 568), the Roper court concluded "juvenile offenders cannot with reliability be classified among the worst offenders" because of three primary differences between juveniles and adults. (Id. at p. 569.) First, juveniles are less mature and responsible than adults and act more recklessly. (Ibid.) Second, juveniles are more susceptible to negative influences and pressures because they have less control over their immediate surroundings. (Ibid.) Third, a juvenile's character "is not as well formed as that of an adult." (Id. at p. 570.) The Roper court continued: "These differences render suspect any conclusion that a juvenile falls among the worst offenders. The susceptibility of juveniles to immature and irresponsible behavior means 'their irresponsible conduct is not as morally reprehensible as that of an adult.' Their own vulnerability and comparative lack of control over their immediate surroundings mean juveniles have a greater claim than adults to be forgiven for failing to escape negative influences in their whole environment. The reality that juveniles still struggle to define their identity means it is less supportable to conclude that even a heinous crime committed by a juvenile is evidence of irretrievably depraved character. From a moral standpoint it would be misguided to equate the failings of a minor with those of an adult, for a greater possibility exists that a minor's character deficiencies will be reformed." (Ibid.) The Roper court also noted that since the decision in Stanford "evidence of national consensus against the death penalty for juveniles" (Roper, supra, 543 U.S. at p. 564) had developed sufficient for the Supreme Court to conclude "that today our society views juveniles . . . as 'categorically less culpable than the average criminal.'" (Id. at p. 567.) Thirty states prohibit the death penalty for juveniles, including 12 that do not impose the death penalty. (Id. at p. 564.) Of those 30 states, five had eliminated the death penalty for juveniles either through legislation or by judicial decision after the Stanford decision. (Id. at p. 565.) In Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, (2005), the court held that juveniles must be treated differently than adults when it comes to sentencing. Roper established that because juveniles have lessened culpability they are less deserving of the most severe punishments. As compared to adults, juveniles have a '"lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility"'; they 'are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure'; and their characters are 'not as well formed.' These salient characteristics mean that 'it is difficult even for expert psychologists to differentiate between the juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.' Accordingly, 'juvenile offenders cannot with reliability be classified among the worst offenders.' . . . Juveniles are more capable of change than are adults, and their actions are less likely to be evidence of 'irretrievably depraved character' than are the actions of adults. The United States Supreme Court held that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid the imposition of the death penalty on juvenile offenders. 543 U.S. at 578. The Court relied in part on its observation that juveniles are less culpable for their actions and, accordingly, "it is evident that the penological justifications for the death penalty apply to them with lesser force than to adults." Id. at 571. Roper prohibits the execution of persons who were juveniles at the time they committed the offense. Further, Roper affirmed the decision of the Missouri Supreme Court to set aside the juvenile offender's death sentence and to resentence him to natural life imprisonment. Roper, 543 U.S. at 560. The Court expressly intimated that a natural life sentence for a juvenile who committed murder is not unconstitutionally cruel and unusual. Roper, 543 U.S. at 572 ("To the extent the juvenile death penalty might have residual deterrent effect, it is worth noting that the punishment of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole is itself a severe sanction, in particular for a young person.").