In Saenz v. Roe (1999) 526 U.S. 489, the United States Supreme Court identified three separate situations in which the travel right had been defined in its prior decisions. The Supreme Court held: "The 'right to travel' discussed in our cases embraces at least three different components. It protects the right of a citizen of one State to enter and to leave another State, the right to be treated as a welcome visitor rather than an unfriendly alien when temporarily present in the second State, and, for those travelers who elect to become permanent residents, the right to be treated like other citizens of that State." (Ibid.) The first aspect of the constitutional travel right is "the right to go from one place to another, including the right to cross state borders while en route . . . ." (Saenz v. Roe, supra, 526 U.S. at p. 500.) In Saenz, the Supreme Court examined a California law which limited the maximum welfare benefits available to newly arrived residents. The Supreme Court concluded that such a reduction in the amount of welfare benefits did not constitute an obstacle to entry into this state. (Id. at p. 501 119 S. Ct. at p. 1525.) In Saenz, the United States Supreme Court set forth the pertinent privileges and immunities clause analysis as follows: "Thus, by virtue of a person's state citizenship, a citizen of one State who travels in other States, intending to return home at the end of his journey, is entitled to enjoy the 'Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States' that he visits. This provision removes 'from the citizens of each State the disabilities of alienage in the other States.' Paul v. Virginia (1868) 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 179 ('Without some provision . . . removing from the citizens of each State the disabilities of alienage in the other States, and giving them equality of privilege with citizens of those States, the Republic would have constituted little more than a league of States; it would not have constituted the Union which now exists'). It provides important protections for nonresidents who enter a State whether to obtain employment, Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 98 S. Ct. 2482, 57 L. Ed. 2d 397 (1978), to procure medical services, Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 200 93 S. Ct. 739, 751-752, 35 L. Ed. 2d 201 (1973), or even to engage in commercial shrimp fishing, Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 68 S. Ct. 1156, 92 L. Ed. 1460 (1948). Those protections are not 'absolute,' but the Clause 'does bar discrimination against citizens of other States where there is no substantial reason for the discrimination beyond the mere fact that they are citizens of other States.' Id., at 396. There may be a substantial reason for requiring the nonresident to pay more than the resident for a hunting license, see Baldwin v. Montana Fish and Game Comm'n . . ., 436 U.S. 371, 390-391 98 S. Ct. 1852, 1863-1864 (1978), or to enroll in the state university, see Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 445 (1973), but our cases have not identified any acceptable reason for qualifying the protection afforded by the Clause for 'the "citizen of State A who ventures into State B" to settle there and establish a home.' Zobel v. Williams (1982) 457 U.S. 55, 74 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment). Permissible justifications for discrimination between residents and nonresidents are simply inapplicable to a nonresident's exercise of the right to move into another State and become a resident of that State." (Saenz v. Roe, supra, 526 U.S. at pp. 501-502.)