In Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), the police directed a physician to take a blood sample from Schmerber's body in order to analyze Schmerber's blood for alcohol content. A report of the chemical analysis of the sample indicated that Schmerber was intoxicated. The report was received in evidence, and Schmerber was convicted of DUI. Schmerber claimed on appeal that the admission of the report compelled him to be a witness against himself, in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The Supreme Court rejected this contention, ruling that "not even a shadow of testimonial compulsion upon or enforced communication by the accused was involved either in the extraction or in the chemical analysis," 384 U.S. at 765, and that Schmerber's "testimonial capacities were in no way implicated." Id. As the court pointed out: both federal and state courts have usually held that it offers no protection against compulsion to submit to fingerprinting, photographing, or measurements, to write or speak for identification, to appear in court, to stand, to assume a stance, to walk, or to make a particular gesture. 384 U.S. at 764. The defendant was arrested at a hospital while receiving treatment for injuries from an accident. Without the defendant's consent, at the direction of a police officer a blood sample was taken from him by a physician, in a medically approved manner. Chemical analysis of the sample was introduced into evidence at the defendant's trial for driving under the influence. The United States Supreme Court held this was a reasonable search. It first noted that the defendant was under arrest upon probable cause, but added, "the mere fact of a lawful arrest does not end our inquiry." (384 U.S. at pp. 768-769.) It added that the same facts that established probable cause for arrest also established probable cause to believe the test of the defendant's blood would likely succeed. ( Id. at pp. 769-770.) It held the police could request the test without first seeking a warrant from a magistrate, because an emergency made seeking a warrant impracticable; the evidence would otherwise be dissipated by normal bodily processes. ( Id. at pp. 770-771.) It concluded, "the attempt to secure evidence of blood-alcohol content in this case was an appropriate incident to petitioner's arrest." ( Id. at p. 771.) The Supreme Court permitted a warrantless search involving a bodily intrusion on the basis of exigent circumstances. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770-72. The case involved the removal of blood from the defendant who had been involved in a collision and arrested for driving while intoxicated. The Court found the search to be permissible because there was a clear indication that the evidence would be found, the officer reasonably could have believed that the evidence would have been destroyed had he sought a warrant, and the search was conducted in a reasonable manner. Ibid. The authority of the police under the Fourth Amendment to conduct a full search of an arrestee's person without a warrant is only skin deep. The policy considerations that justify the search incident to arrest--the need to disarm the suspect and to prevent the destruction of evidence under the suspect's direct control--do not apply to searches involving intrusions beyond the body's surface. The interests in human dignity and privacy which the Fourth Amendment protects forbid any such intrusions on the mere chance that desired evidence might be obtained. In the absence of a clear indication that in fact such evidence will be found, these fundamental human interests require law officers to suffer the risk that such evidence may disappear unless there is an immediate search. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 769-70. The Court stated that considerations that ordinarily permit a search of a defendant incident to an arrest "have little applicability with respect to searches and bodily intrusions beyond the body's surface. The interests in human dignity and privacy which the Fourth Amendment protects forbid any such intrusions on the mere chance that desired evidence might be obtained. In the absence of a clear indication that in fact such evidence will be found, these fundamental human interests require law officers to suffer the risk that such evidence may disappear unless there is an immediate search." 384 U.S. at 769-70, 86 S. Ct. at 1835. Recognizing that "interests in human dignity and privacy" arise whenever the police need to enter a person's body to secure evidence, the United States Supreme Court concluded that a lawful arrest alone does not justify police intrusion into a person's body (id. at 769-770). Rather, there must be "a clear indication that . . . relevant evidence will be found" inside an arrestee's body and a search warrant authorizing the seizure of evidence must be obtained unless an emergency situation exists (id. at 770). The Court upheld the warrantless search, because the officer "might reasonably have believed that he was confronted with an emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant under the circumstances, threatened 'the destruction of evidence.'" (Id., at 770 .) The Court reasoned that "particularly in a case such as this, where time had to be taken to bring the accused to a hospital and to investigate the scene of the accident, there was no time to seek out a magistrate and secure a warrant. Given these special facts, we conclude that the attempt to secure evidence of blood-alcohol content in this case was an appropriate incident to petitioner's arrest." (Id. at 770-771.) In Schmerber, the Supreme Court determined that the blood evidence was legally obtained and admissible because the extraction was performed in a reasonable manner under exigent circumstances. The Court concluded that an emergency existed because the percentage of alcohol in the blood begins to diminish shortly after the person stops drinking, which meant that the time expended to secure a warrant would have caused relevant evidence to degrade or disappear (see Schmerber, 384 US at 770-771). In Schmerber v. California (1966), a physician, at the direction of a police officer, drew a blood sample from the defendant without his consent to test the level of alcohol in his blood. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 758, 86 S.Ct. at 1829. The Supreme Court concluded that a warrantless search that involved an intrusion into the body, such as the extraction of a blood sample, would be upheld only if there were exigent circumstances that made it impracticable to obtain a warrant prior to the search. Id. at 770-771. The Schmerber Court rejected the claim that the seizure of blood was an unreasonable search and seizure, and identified three requirements deemed critical to the reasonableness of the intrusion in question. First, there must be a "clear indication" that in fact the desired evidence will be found. Second, the test chosen to measure defendant's blood alcohol level must be a reasonable one. Third, the test must be performed in a reasonable manner. 384 U.S. at 770-71, 86 S.Ct. at 1835-36; Burnett v. Municipality of Anchorage (9th Cir. 1986), 806 F.2d 1447, 1449. In Schmerber v. California, the defendant was involved in a motor vehicle accident and taken to the hospital for treatment of his injuries. Schmerber, supra, 384 U.S. at 758. The police officer on the scene noted that the defendant appeared to be under the influence of alcohol. Id. at 768. Later at the hospital, the police officer arrested the defendant and directed a physician to take a blood sample over the defendant's refusal. Id. at 758-59. The United States Supreme Court held that the extraction of blood over a defendant's objection and without a warrant would only be reasonable if certain critical factors were met. Id. at 768-71. These factors include: the existence of exigent circumstances making it too difficult to obtain a warrant; the reasonableness of the officers actions considering the circumstances, and the sample must be taken in a medically acceptable manner. Ibid. The Court in Schmerber, found the blood extraction to be reasonable, but advised that "it would be a different case if the police initiated the violence, refused to respect a reasonable request to undergo a different form of testing, or responded to resistance with inappropriate force." Id. at 760 n.4., 86 S.Ct. at 1830 n. 4, 16 L.Ed.2d at 913 n. 4. The Court stated that "the Fourth Amendment's proper function is to constrain, not against all intrusions as such, but against intrusions which are not justified in the circumstances, or which are made in an improper manner." Id. at 768. The Court discussed how blood tests are "highly effective means of determining the degree to which a person is under the influence." Id. at 771. As such, the Court opined that a blood test is reasonable because it "involves virtually no risk, trauma, or pain." Ibid. In finding the procedure utilized to be reasonable, the Court discussed how "the delay necessary to obtain a warrant under the circumstances, threatened 'the destruction of evidence.'" Id. at 770. The Court considered whether a warrantless blood draw performed by a physician at the direction of a police officer while a driver under arrest for DUI was in the hospital receiving treatment violated the constitution. The court concluded the officer "might reasonably have believed that he was confronted with an emergency," and could not wait for a warrant, due to the fact that blood alcohol diminishes after drinking stops. Id. at 770. The court held that the driver's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated. Id. at 772. The Court ruled that a blood sample "taken by a physician in a hospital environment according to accepted medical practices" was reasonable. Id. at 771-72. The Court further stated, albeit in dicta: We are thus not presented with the serious questions which would arise if a search involving use of a medical technique, even of the most rudimentary sort, were made by other than medical personnel or in other than a medical environment-for example, if it were administered by police in the privacy of the station house. To tolerate searches under these conditions might be to invite an unjustified element of personal risk of infection and pain. Id. In Schmerber v. California, a blood draw the Court characterized as safe, commonplace, and nontraumatic. And, notwithstanding the Court's acknowledgment that the blood draw was a comparatively benign intrusion, it carved no exceptions to its conclusion that police "intrusions into an individual's body" in search of evidence would presumptively require a warrant in the absence of exigent circumstances. 384 U.S. at 772, 86 S. Ct. at 1836. Thus, to the extent the dissent suggests that some lesser types of state intrusion inside a defendant's body could proceed without a warrant based on the mere presence of reasonable or probable cause, that view is directly contradicted by controlling jurisprudence we must follow. Id. at 771. The trial court essentially determined that the possible increased risks associated with on-site testing did not render the blood draw here unreasonable. See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771-72. The United States Supreme Court observed: Search warrants are ordinarily required for searches of dwellings, and absent an emergency, no less could be required where intrusions into the human body are concerned. The requirement that a warrant be obtained is a requirement that inferences to support the search "be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." The importance of informed, detached and deliberate determinations of the issue whether or not to invade another's body in search of evidence of guilt is indisputable and great. There, the Court expressly rejected the government's contentions that either the fact of a defendant's arrest or the presence of probable cause obviated the need for a warrant to conduct a search beyond the body's surface. Id. at 769-70. The Court emphasized in Schmerber, a governmental search within a crime suspect's body profoundly implicates "the interests in human dignity and privacy which the Fourth Amendment protects." 384 U.S. at 769-70, 86 S. Ct. at 1835. The Schmerber Court stated that: The interests in human dignity and privacy which the Fourth Amendment protects forbid any intrusions into a person's blood on the mere chance that desired evidence might be obtained. In the absence of a clear indication that in fact such evidence will be found, these fundamental human interests require law officers to suffer the risk that such evidence may disappear . . . .Id. at 769-70. The United States Supreme Court held that blood alcohol evidence could be taken without a DUI suspect's consent and without a warrant. The police had requested a blood sample, and over the suspect's verbal objection, a doctor drew a sample. The evidence was admitted at trial and established the suspect's intoxication. 384 U.S. at 758-759. The United States Supreme Court "concluded that the attempt to secure evidence of blood-alcohol content in this case was an appropriate incident to the defendant's arrest." (Id. at p. 771.) It explained the officer may "have believed that he was confronted with an emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances, threatened 'the destruction of evidence,'. We are told that the percentage of alcohol in the blood begins to diminish shortly after drinking stops, as the body functions to eliminate it from the system." (Id. at p. 770.) The court further found the blood sample was taken according to accepted medical practices and in a reasonable manner. (Id. at p. 771.) Among other things, the United States Supreme Court in Schmerber addressed whether the warrantless blood test violated the Fourth Amendment. The high court concluded that "compulsory administration of a blood test" was a search under the Fourth Amendment. (384 U.S. at p. 767.) Although "there was plainly probable cause ..." to arrest the defendant on suspicion of DUI, the court found that the search could not be justified as a search incident to arrest because the cases articulating that exception to the warrant requirement "have little applicability with respect to searches involving intrusions beyond the body's surface." (Id. at pp. 768, 769.) The court in Schmerber noted that "search warrants are ordinarily required for searches of dwellings, and, absent an emergency, no less could be required where intrusions into the human body are concerned." (Schmerber, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 770.) However, the court concluded that the arresting officer "might reasonably have believed that he was confronted with an emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances, threatened 'the destruction of evidence,'; (Ibid.) The high court acknowledged "that the percentage of alcohol in the blood begins to diminish shortly after drinking stops, as the body functions to eliminate it from the system," and because the defendant had to be rushed to the hospital and the officers had to investigate the accident scene, it concluded "there was no time to seek out a magistrate and secure a warrant." (Id. at pp. 770, 771.) Under those "special facts," the court held that the warrantless search was justified. (Id. at p. 771.) In Schmerber, the United States Supreme Court held that "compulsory administration of a blood test ... plainly involves the broadly conceived reach of a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment." (Schmerber, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 767.) Because "the Fourth Amendment's proper function is to constrain, not against all intrusions as such, but against intrusions which are not justified in the circumstances, or which are made in an improper manner," one question before the court was "whether the means and procedures employed in taking the defendant's blood respected relevant Fourth Amendment standards of reasonableness." (Id. at p. 768.) The defendant in Schmerber was transported to a hospital because of the injuries he sustained in a car accident and, "at the direction of a police officer, a blood sample was ... withdrawn from petitioner's body by a physician at the hospital." (Schmerber, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 758.)