In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) the United States Supreme Court considered the definition of "voluntary consent" in the context of a search and seizure. "When the subject of a search is not in custody and the State attempts to justify a search on the basis of his consent, the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments require that it demonstrate that the consent was in fact voluntarily given, and not the result of duress or coercion, express or implied." The Court noted that "voluntariness" goes beyond the literal meaning of "a knowing choice." Unless a person is unconscious or incapacitated, all statements made could be considered "voluntary in the sense of representing a choice of alternatives." Under this view, even physically-forced consent would be voluntary because, in theory, the suspect had a choice--either consent to the search or be beaten. On the other hand, we do not ask whether the consent would have been given "but-for" the police actions or inquiries. Under this view, "virtually no statement would be voluntary because very few people give incriminating statements in the absence of official action of some kind." Therefore, the premise of voluntariness does not mean that police are required to never question an accused in custody, but they must have limits to the measures taken during their interrogations. "In determining whether a defendant's will was overborne in a particular case," the Schneckloth Court developed the standard by which consent is tested for voluntariness. Trial courts "must assess the totality of all the surrounding circumstances--both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation." By looking at the circumstances leading up to the search, the reaction of the accused to pressure, and any other factor deemed relevant, a trial court can determine whether the statement of consent was given voluntarily. Some relevant factors the Supreme Court has taken into consideration in past cases are: the youth of the accused, the education of the accused, the intelligence of the accused, the constitutional advice given to the accused, the length of the detention, the repetitiveness of the questioning, and the use of physical punishment. The United States Supreme Court held that the requirement of a "knowing and intelligent waiver" does not apply to a determination whether consent to search is voluntary for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 241. In the context of procedural due process rights, the Court described its cases as indicating only that "every reasonable presumption should be indulged against . . . waiver" and that waiver would not be presumed. Id. at 235 n.16. Once an officer obtains consent to search, the officer need not obtain a warrant to conduct the search or ensure that there is probable cause for the search. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 219 (recognizing that one of the "well settled" and "specifically established exceptions to the requirements of both a warrant and probable cause is a search that is conducted pursuant to consent"). The Court clarified in Schneckloth that the State need only prove that the defendant's consent to the search was freely and voluntarily given. Id. at 222. The Supreme Court in Schneckloth rejected an argument that a Miranda-style warning informing the defendant of his right to refuse consent was necessary. 412 U.S. at 246-48. The Court concluded knowledge of a right to refuse is not "an indispensable element of a valid consent" to a search. Id. at 246. Schneckloth emphasized the "narrow" scope of its decision and stated that its holding applied "only . . . when the subject of a search is not in custody." The United States Supreme Court stated: "There is a vast difference between those rights that protect a fair criminal trial and the rights guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment. Nothing, either in the purposes behind requiring a 'knowing' and 'intelligent' waiver of trial rights, or in the practical application of such a requirement suggests that it ought to be extended to the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures. A strict standard of waiver has been applied to those rights guaranteed to a criminal defendant to insure that he will be accorded the greatest possible opportunity to utilize every facet of the constitutional model of a fair criminal trial. Any trial conducted in derogation of that model leaves open the possibility that the trial reached an unfair result precisely because all the protections specified in the Constitution were not provided. . . . "The protections of the Fourth Amendment are of a wholly different order, and have nothing whatever to do with promoting the fair ascertainment of truth at a criminal trial. . . . The guarantees of the Fourth Amendment stand 'as a protection of quite different constitutional values--values reflecting the concern of our society for the right of each individual to be let alone. . . .' . Nor can it even be said that a search, as opposed to an eventual trial, is somehow 'unfair' if a person consents to a search. . . . And, unlike those constitutional guarantees that protect a defendant at trial, it cannot be said every reasonable presumption ought to be indulged against voluntary relinquishment." (Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at pp. 241-243.) The United States Supreme Court rejected the view that failure of the police to inform a defendant of the right to refuse a consent to search should be deemed sufficient to make a consent--given in the absence of such a warning--a coerced consent. But Schneckloth did point out that the determination of whether a consent to search was voluntary or coerced was to be governed by the totality-of-the-circumstances rule, and that the failure to notify a defendant of the right to refuse a requested consent to search was a factor which could be taken into account in applying the totality-of-the-circumstances rule in determining whether a consent to search was voluntary or coerced. The Supreme Court turned to the "judicial exposition of the meaning of 'voluntariness'" in the context of confessions to define the test for a suspect's consent. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 223. The Supreme Court observed that the voluntariness test in confession cases reflected the competing values implicated in police interrogation: "the need for police questioning as a tool for the effective enforcement of criminal laws" on one hand, and "society's deeply felt belief that the criminal law cannot be used as an instrument of unfairness, and that the possibility of unfair and even brutal police tactics poses a real and serious threat to civilized notions of justice" on the other. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 224-25. Because consent cases raise similar considerations, and because it reasoned that "the requirement of a 'voluntary' consent reflects a fair accommodation of the constitutional requirements involved," the Supreme Court held that "there was no reason to depart in the area of consent searches, from the traditional definition of 'voluntariness.'" Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 229. Under the test adopted in Schneckloth, a consent will be deemed involuntary and thus invalid where it is "coerced, by explicit or implicit means, by implied threat or covert force" (Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 228, 36 L. Ed. 2d at 863, 93 S. Ct. at 2048) and is therefore not "the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice" by the suspect (Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 225.) This assessment of voluntariness "is a question of fact to be determined from all the circumstances" (Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248-49, 36 L. Ed. 2d at 875, 93 S. Ct. at 2059) that takes into account both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the encounter (see Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226.)