In Security Sav. Bank v. State of California (1923) 263 U.S. 282, the United States Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a California statute that allowed for the escheatment to the state of bank deposits that had been unclaimed for 20 years. The statute required that the state file suit seeking escheatment and that it effect personal service on the bank in which the deposits were being held. (Id. at p. 284.) In addition, the state was required to publish the summons for four weeks in a newspaper in the county in which the suit was filed. (Id. at p. 285.) The bank claimed that the statute's notice publication provision did not provide its depositors with adequate notice of the escheatment of their accounts. (Id. at. p. 286.) The court rejected the bank's argument, stating: "It is urged that the notice is insufficient, because service may not be made by publication until it has been shown by affidavit that personal service is impossible or impractical. Such an affidavit is a common requirement in statutes providing for service by publication on absent defendants. But it is not constitutionally indispensable. The reason for requiring the affidavit is that ordinarily, personal service would be more likely to acquaint a defendant with the pendency of the suit. But here the general facts which underlie the legislation establish the futility of such a requirement. It may be that in California banks usually endeavor to ascertain the whereabouts of depositors whose accounts have remained dormant for many years. The statute applies only to deposits in the name of a person who is not known to the president or managing officer of the bank to be alive, whose account has not been added to or drawn upon for twenty years, and who has not filed within that time any notice or claim giving his then residence. The Legislature evidently assumed that it would be impossible to serve such depositors personally. The Supreme Court of the state held that the Legislature was warranted in this assumption. The owners of the deposits were, therefore, treated like persons unknown. We cannot say that the view entertained by the Legislature and the state courts was so unreasonable as to constitute a denial of due process." (Security Sav. Bank, supra, 263 U.S. at pp. 288-289.)