In Segura v. United States (1984) 468 U.S. 796, narcotics agents arrested one of the defendants and had probable cause to believe that a drug operation was being operated in the defendants' apartment. The narcotics agents entered and secured the apartment and remained there for 19 hours until a magistrate issued a search warrant. The warrant affidavit did not mention that the police had entered the defendant's apartment or that they had observed drug paraphernalia on entry. (Id. at pp. 799-801.) The issue before the United States Supreme Court was whether the drugs found during the later search should have been suppressed. (Id. at p. 804.) The Supreme Court reiterated that "evidence obtained as a direct result of an unconstitutional search or seizure is plainly subject to exclusion. The question to be resolved when it is claimed that evidence subsequently obtained is 'tainted' or is 'fruit' of a prior illegality is whether the challenged evidence was '"come at by exploitation of the initial illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint."'" (Segura v. United States, supra, 468 U.S. at pp. 804-805.) On the facts of the case before it, the Supreme Court concluded that "whether the initial entry was illegal or not was irrelevant to the admissibility of the challenged evidence because there was an 'independent source' for the warrant under which that evidence was seized." (Id. at pp. 813-814.) The Supreme Court so found because "none of the information on which the warrant was secured was derived from or related in any way to the initial entry," and thus the search warrant was "a 'means sufficiently distinguishable' to purge the evidence of any 'taint' arising from the entry." (Id. at p. 814) The Supreme Court found a 19-hour seizure of a dwelling by police awaiting a search warrant was not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The court stated: "We hold . . . that securing a dwelling, on the basis of probable cause, to prevent the destruction or removal of evidence while a search warrant is being sought is not itself an unreasonable seizure of either the dwelling or its contents." ( Id. at p. 810.) The court concluded the 19-hour "occupation of the apartment which continued throughout the night and into the next day" was not unreasonable because "such delay in securing a warrant in a large metropolitan center unfortunately is not uncommon . . . . And there is no suggestion that the officers, in bad faith, purposely delayed obtaining the warrant." ( Id. at p. 812.) In contrast to the 19-hour property seizure in Segura, Inman's house was seized for five hours. Detective Bird testified at the suppression hearing that he was "gone the entire time preparing the warrant and getting it signed." Given that Bird left to obtain the warrant late in the day (4:00 p.m.), it seems to us not unreasonable, though perhaps regrettable, that it would take five hours to secure a warrant. Importantly, as the trial court noted, the police "did the right thing" in obtaining a warrant to search. Moreover, as in Segura, "there is no suggestion that the officers, in bad faith, purposely delayed obtaining the warrant." ( Segura v. United States, supra, 468 U.S. at p. 812.)The Court recognized the distinction between an entry into a home - a "seizure" of the premises - and a search of the home. The Court stated that "the heightened protection we accord privacy interests is simply not implicated where a seizure of premises, not a search, is at issue.