In Allen v. Illinois (1986) 478 U.S. 364 106 S. Ct. 2988, 92 L. Ed. 2d 296, the United States Supreme Court rejected the claim that proceedings under the Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act were criminal within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment's guarantee against compulsory self-incrimination. ( Allen, supra, 478 U.S. at pp. 365, 368 106 S. Ct. at pp. 2991-2992, 92 L. Ed. 2d at pp. 302-304.) The Illinois statute required the inmate Allen to submit to two psychiatric examinations. at a bench trial to determine whether Allen was a sexually dangerous person, the state presented the testimony of the two examining psychiatrists, over defense counsel's objection they had elicited information from his client in violation of the privilege against self-incrimination. ( Id. at pp. 365-366 106 S. Ct. at pp. 2990-2991, 92 L. Ed. 2d at pp. 302-303). The trial court found Allen to be a sexually dangerous person under the Illinois act. ( Id. at p. 366 106 S. Ct. at pp. 2990-2991, 92 L. Ed. 2d at p. 303.) In Kansas v. Hendricks (1977) 521 U.S. 346 117 S. Ct. 2072, 138 L. Ed. 2d 501, the Supreme Court ruled proceedings under the Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act were not criminal for purposes of the Fifth Amendment guarantee against compulsory self-incrimination. ( Allen, supra, 478 U.S. at p. 374 106 S. Ct. at pp. 2994-2995, 92 L. Ed. 2d at pp. 307-308). It also declined to apply the privilege in the noncriminal commitment proceeding under the due process clause. ( Id. at p. 374 106 S. Ct. at pp. 2994-2995, 92 L. Ed. 2d at p. 308.) Allen's rationale applies with equal force to the case before us: