In Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), the United States Supreme Court considered whether a South Carolina statute violated the appellant's First Amendment rights by disqualifying her from receiving unemployment benefits after she refused to work on Saturday, which was her religion's Sabbath Day. 374 U.S. at 399-400. The government appellees asserted a compelling governmental interest in preventing "the filing of fraudulent claims by those feigning religious objections," which would deplete government funds and interfere with employers' efforts to schedule Saturday work. Id. at 407. Although the appellees had not made this argument to the state supreme court, the Court held that, even if they had done so, "it would plainly be incumbent upon the appellees to demonstrate that no alternative forms of regulation would combat such abuses without infringing First Amendment rights." Id. Because the appellees did not meet this burden, the Court upheld the appellant's claim to a free exercise of religion exemption. Id. at 410. The United States Supreme Court has held that: "The door of the Free Exercise Clause stands tightly closed against any governmental regulation of religious beliefs as such, and that government may neither compel affirmation of a repugnant belief nor penalize or discriminate against individuals or groups because they hold religious views abhorrent to the authorities, nor employ the taxing power to inhibit the dissemination of particular religious views." But the Court has "rejected challenges under the Free Exercise Clause to governmental regulation of certain overt acts prompted by religious beliefs or principles for 'even when the action is in accord with one's religious convictions, it is not totally free from legislative restrictions.'" Id. at 403, 83 S. Ct. at 1793 . "The conduct or actions so regulated have invariably posed some substantial threat to public safety, peace or order." Id. In Sherbert, the Supreme Court held that the disqualification of a member of the Seventh Day Adventist Church for unemployment benefits under the South Carolina Unemployment Compensation Act, because of her refusal to work on Saturday, imposed a burden on the free exercise of her religion. The Court arrived at its conclusion by considering whether there was some compelling state interest in the statute which justified the substantial infringement of the appellant's First Amendment right and found no such interest. Id. at 406-407, 83 S. Ct. at 1795.