In Smith v. Doe 538 U.S. 84, (2003), the United States Supreme Court upheld an Alaska statute requiring sex offenders to register with law enforcement and making much of the registration information publicly accessible. The Alaska statute allowed law enforcement to make publicly accessible via the Internet a registered sex offender's name, aliases, home address, photograph, place of employment, crime, length and conditions of sentence, and a statement whether the offender was in compliance with registration requirements and could be located. (Id. at p. 91.) The Supreme Court concluded the Alaska Legislature intended to create a civil, nonpunitive regulatory scheme and the statute was not punitive in effect. (Id. at pp. 96, 105-106.) "Given the general mobility of our population, for Alaska to make its registry system available and easily accessible throughout the State was not so excessive a regulatory requirement as to become a punishment." (Id. at p. 105.) The Court held that registration and disclosure on a Web site "are less harsh than the sanctions of occupational debarment, which the court has held to be nonpunitive. That state's Megan's Law does not restrain activities sex offenders may pursue but leaves them free to change jobs or residences." (Id. at p. 100.) The court rejected as conjecture the argument that the law was punitive because the stigma attached to sex crimes was likely to make registrants completely unemployable and preclude them from finding housing. (Ibid.) The court explained that "although the public availability of the information may have a lasting and painful impact on the convicted sex offender, these consequences flow not from that state's Megan's Law's registration and dissemination provisions, but from the fact of conviction, already a matter of public record. The State makes the facts underlying the offenses and the resulting convictions accessible so members of the public can take the precautions they deem necessary before dealing with the registrant." (Id. at p. 101.) In Smith v. Doe (2003) the court considered as a matter of first impression whether a sex offender registration and notification law constitutes retroactive punishment in violation of the ex post facto clause. The Alaska law requires persons convicted of aggravated sex offenses to register for life, and certain information is made available to the public on a Web site, including the offender's name, aliases, date of birth, address, physical description, photograph, place of employment, vehicle license and identification numbers, crime for which convicted, and length and conditions of sentence. (Id. at p. 91.) The court held the posting of such information is not punishment, and thus the Alaska law did not violate the ex post facto clause. The court determined the Legislature intended to create a civil scheme designed to protect the public from harm. (Smith v. Doe, supra, 538 U.S. at pp. 93-96.) The court then applied the factors outlined in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez (1963) 372 U.S. 144, 168 9 L. Ed. 2d 644, 83 S. Ct. 554 (Mendoza-Martinez), to determine whether the law is nonetheless punitive in its purpose or effect, and determined it is not. (Smith v. Doe, supra, at pp. 97, 105.) The court concluded the statutory scheme serves a legitimate nonpunitive object of public safety, which is advanced by alerting the public to the risk of sex offenders in their neighborhoods; does not involve a traditional means of punishment; does not impose any physical restraint; and is not excessive in its lifetime duration given the recidivism rate of child molesters. (Id. at pp. 97, 100-104.) The Court explained the "risk of recidivism posed by sex offenders is 'frightening and high,'" and when they reenter society "'they are much more likely than any other type of offender to be rearrested'" for another sex crime. In Smith v. Doe, supra, 538 U.S. at pages 103-104,, the court explained the ex post facto clause "does not preclude a State from making reasonable categorical judgments that conviction of specified crimes should entail particular regulatory consequences. We have upheld against ex post facto challenges laws imposing regulatory burdens on individuals convicted of crimes without any corresponding risk assessment. ... 'Doubtless, one who has violated the criminal law may thereafter reform and become in fact possessed of a good moral character. But the legislature has power in cases of this kind to make a rule of universal application ... .' The State's determination to legislate with respect to convicted sex offenders as a class, rather than require individual determination of their dangerousness, does not make the statute a punishment under the Ex Post Facto Clause." The United States Supreme Court confirmed a two-part test to determine whether a statutory scheme is punitive for purposes of ex post facto analysis. The court first determines whether the legislature intended to impose punishment: "If the intention of the legislature was to impose punishment, that ends the inquiry." (Id. at p. 92.) If the court determines the legislature intended to enact "a regulatory scheme that is civil and nonpunitive," then the court must determine whether the statutory scheme is "'"so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate the State's intention" to deem it "civil."'" (Ibid.) To analyze the effects of the statute, the court must consider seven factors noted in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez (1963) 372 U.S. 144. Those factors, which are "'neither exhaustive nor dispositive,'" are whether the statutory scheme (1) has been regarded in our history and traditions as punishment, (2) imposes an affirmative disability or restraint, (3) promotes the traditional aims of punishment, (4) has a rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose, (5) is excessive with respect to this purpose, (6) comes into play only on a finding of scienter, and (7) applies to behavior which is already a crime. (Smith v. Doe, supra, 538 U.S. at pp. 97, 105) The Court found significant that it did not subject respondents to an affirmative disability or restraint, there was no evidence that the Act led to substantial occupational or housing disadvantages that would not have otherwise occurred, the Act did not require in-person updates, and offenders were "free to move where they wish and to live and work as other citizens; and the regulatory scheme was not excessive with respect to the Act's purpose." Id. at 100-101.