In Smith v. Massachusetts, 543 U.S. 462 (2005), the defendant moved for a finding of not guilty on a firearm possession charge at the conclusion of the prosecution's case. The court granted the motion, and the defense case proceeded on the remaining charges. After the defense rested, the prosecutor brought to the court's attention a case that showed the court's prior acquittal was legally incorrect. The court reversed it acquittal ruling and allowed the firearm-possession count to go to the jury. The jury thereafter convicted the defendant on that count. (Smith, supra, 543 U.S. at pp. 464-466.) The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that double jeopardy principles precluded the court from reconsidering the court-ordered acquittal once the defense rested its case. (Id. at pp. 472-475.) The United States Supreme Court has held that "an order entering . . . a finding that the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to sustain a conviction meets the definition of acquittal that our double-jeopardy cases have consistently used." In Smith, the United States Supreme Court considered a case in which the trial judge, after determining that the prosecution had failed to meet its burden of proof, applied a Massachusetts Rule of Criminal Procedure to enter a finding of not guilty for a defendant on a charge of possessing a specific type of firearm. 543 U.S. at 465-66. Instructively, the Supreme Court's reasoning states: Massachusetts' characterization of the required finding of not guilty as a legal rather than factual determination is, as a matter of double jeopardy law, . . . not binding on us; what matters is that, as the Massachusetts Rules authorize, the judge evaluated the Commonwealth's evidence and determined that it was legally insufficient to sustain a conviction. Id. at 468-69. The Supreme Court went on to hold: An order entering . . . a finding that the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to sustain a conviction thus meets the definition of acquittal that our double-jeopardy cases have consistently used: It actually represents a resolution, correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged. Id. at 467-68. Explaining its rationale in reaching this result, the Supreme Court stated: To put it differently: Requiring someone to defend against a charge of which he has already been acquitted is prejudice per se for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause - even when the acquittal was erroneous because the evidence was sufficient. . . . Our double-jeopardy cases make clear that an acquittal bars the prosecution from seeking another opportunity to supply evidence which it failed to muster before jeopardy terminated. Id. at 473.