In Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 (1982), the high court reiterated the rule that "the remedy for allegations of juror partiality is a hearing in which the defendant has the opportunity to prove actual bias." (Smith, supra, 455 U.S. at p. 215.) Smith involved a juror who submitted an application for employment with the district attorney's office during a criminal trial being prosecuted by the same office. (Id. at p. 212.) When the assistant district attorney in charge of the hiring process learned of the job application, he brought it to the attention of his supervisor and the two attorneys prosecuting the case on which the juror was seated. (Ibid.) The two prosecutors took steps to avoid learning the contents of the juror's application and to have no contact with him during trial. (Id. at p. 213.) However, the prosecutors did not inform the trial court or defense counsel about the juror's job application until after the defendant was convicted. (Ibid.) Defense counsel then moved to set aside the verdict on the basis of juror misconduct. (Ibid.) The trial court denied the motion, and the court of appeals reversed based on the conclusion that any other holding would encourage prosecutors to wrongfully withhold information about possible juror misconduct. (Id. at pp. 213-214.) The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals, explaining that due process safeguards the fairness of trials rather than focusing on whether counsel may have engaged in unethical conduct. (Id. at pp. 220-221.) Smith does not indicate that the defense sought to interview or call as a witness the juror who submitted the job application. (See Smith, supra, 455 U.S. at pp. 213-214.) The high court affirmed a verdict returned by a jury that included a juror who applied "for employment as a major felony investigator in the District Attorney's Office" (id. at p. 212) during trial despite "the obvious inherent motivation the job applicant may have had to reach a verdict favorable to the prospective employer." (See In re Carpenter (1995) 9 Cal.4th 634, 647.) The court "rejected the argument that 'the law must impute bias to jurors' in that position" and stated it had "long held that the remedy for allegations of juror partiality is a hearing in which the defendant has the opportunity to prove actual bias. " (Ibid.) In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor recognized that "there are some extreme situations that would justify a finding of implied bias." (Smith v. Phillips, supra, 455 U.S. at p. 222.) She listed some examples: "a revelation that the juror is an actual employee of the prosecuting agency, that the juror is a close relative of one of the participants in the trial or the criminal transaction, or that the juror was a witness or somehow involved in the criminal transaction." (Ibid.)