In Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983), a bare majority of the court reversed a life sentence without possibility of parole for a nonviolent felony offender. The defendant had been convicted of "uttering a 'no account' check for $ 100," a crime that would normally have a maximum penalty of five years in the state penitentiary and a $ 5,000 fine. ( Solem, supra, 463 U.S. at p. 281.) The defendant also had six prior convictions for nonviolent felonies. ( Id. at p. 279.) The court held, "a criminal sentence must be proportionate to the crime for which the defendant has been convicted." ( Id. at p. 290.) The court also established three objective criteria to guide courts in analyzing whether the sentence was disproportionate to the crime: "(i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions." ( Id. at p. 292.) Helm had been convicted of a seventh nonviolent, relatively minor, felony of uttering a "no account" check in the amount of $ 100 in South Dakota. ( Id. at p. 296.) "His prior offenses, although classified as felonies, were all relatively minor. All were nonviolent and none was a crime against a person." ( Id. at pp. 296-297.) "His record involved no instance of violence of any kind." ( Id. at p. 297, fn. 22.) Relatively similar offenses involving $ 100 had been designated as misdemeanors in that state. ( Id. at p. 296, fn. 20.) Nevertheless, he had been sentenced to the most severe penalty possible short of capital punishment. ( Id. at p. 297.) The United States Supreme Court, concentrating on the nonviolent nature of both the defendant's current and past offenses, found a life without the possibility of parole sentence for a seventh nonviolent felony to be unconstitutional. ( Id. at p. 296.) A bare majority of the court held "a court's proportionality analysis under the Eighth Amendment should be guided by objective criteria, including (i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions." ( Id. at p. 292.) A majority of the Supreme Court concluded a three-part test should govern analysis of federal cruel and unusual punishment claims. It focused on "(i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions." ( Id. at p. 292.) However, this test did not retain the support of a majority of the court in Harmelin v. Michigan (1991) 501 U.S. 957. Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, concluded Solem was wrongly decided and that the Eighth Amendment does not guarantee proportionality of sentences. ( Id. at p. 965.) Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices O'Connor and Souter, concluded that the Eighth Amendment prohibits only sentences which are "grossly disproportionate" to the crime. ( Id. at p. 1001.) These three justices concluded that consideration of the second and third Solem factors is necessary only when the first factor suggests the sentence may be grossly disproportionate. When the first factor shows the sentence is constitutional, the analysis is complete. ( Id. at p. 1005.) The Supreme Court held imposition of an LWOP sentence on an adult offender "grossly disproportionate" (Solem, supra, 463 U.S. at p. 288) to the defendant's "crime of recidivism" (Harmelin, supra, 501 U.S. at p. 998 (conc. opn. of Kennedy, J.)), which was predicated on a current offense of "uttering a 'no account' check for $ 100" and the defendant's lengthy criminal history that included seven nonviolent felonies. (Solem, at pp. 279-281.) Echoing the trinity of factors articulated in Lynch, Solem counseled that "a court's proportionality analysis under the Eighth Amendment should be guided by objective criteria, including (i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions." (Solem, at p. 292.) Solem observed that "no one factor will be dispositive in a given case." (Id. at p. 291, fn. 17.) The Supreme Court held that "a criminal sentence must be proportionate to the crime for which the defendant has been convicted." ( Solem v. Helm, supra, 463 U.S. at p. 290.) The court declared that "a court's proportionality analysis under the Eighth Amendment should be guided by objective criteria, including (i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions." ( Id. at p. 292.) The court concluded that a life sentence without possibility of parole for Helm's offense ran afoul of the Eighth Amendment because it was significantly disproportionate. ( Id. at p. 303.) In sum, the defendant was sentenced under a South Dakota recidivist statute to a life term without possibility of parole after committing his seventh nonviolent felony. A bare majority of the court held that the Eighth Amendment includes a prohibition of "sentences that are disproportionate to the crime committed" (id. at p. 284), and found Helm's sentence unconstitutional because it was "significantly disproportionate to his crime . . ." (id. at p. 303). The court adopted a three-part test for determining proportionality: "a court's proportionality analysis under the Eighth Amendment should be guided by objective criteria, including (i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions." (Id. at p. 292.) Helm was sentenced to a term of life without the possibility of parole under a South Dakota recidivist sentencing scheme. His only hope of a sentence reduction was an act of executive clemency, an event far less common in South Dakota than the granting of parole where authorized; no life sentence had been commuted in the eight years preceding Solem. (Solem v. Helm, supra, 463 U.S. at p. 302.) The offense that triggered the life sentence was the "uttering of a 'no account' check for $ 100 (id. at p. 281, ), and Helm had previously suffered six felony convictions: three counts of "third-degree burglary" and individual counts of "obtaining money under false pretenses"; "grand larceny"; and "third-offense driving while intoxicated" (id. at pp. 279-280). In invalidating the sentence, the court acknowledged "that Helm's prior convictions are relevant to the sentencing decision," but, the court stated, "we must focus on the principal felony--the felony that triggers the life sentence--since Helm already has paid the penalty for each of his prior offenses." (Id. at p. 296, fn. 21.) The court found it significant that all of Helms's prior convictions, "although classified as felonies, were . . . relatively minor" and "nonviolent, and none was a crime against a person." (Id. at pp. 296-297.)